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IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYO




Is the family primarily a biologic unit composed ofa fertile male, afer-
tile female and children who are genetically theirs, or is the family an
essentially consensual unit wherein a man and a woman who are married
to each other agree to have and raise children, to regard themselves and
the children as afamily, and to give each other the comforts of material
and emotional support, regardless of any genetic nexus?'
HE birth of Louise Brown on July 25, 1978, prompted many to
question the definition of "family" in a world of biological tech-
nology.that could produce a human life conceived outside of the
mother's body, or "in vitro." Although there were previous undocumented
reports of the birth of in vitro babies, 2 and a number of ongoing studies
and experiments with the process, 3 the general public did not become
acutely aware of the reality of a process that could unite a human egg and
sperm in a laboratory until the birth of Louise Brown.4
* J.D., Loyola University. Associate Professor, Loyola University School of Law,
New Orleans, Louisiana. The author wishes to acknowledge gratefully the invaluable re-
search assistance of Mary Ann Dart and the Alfred J. Bonomo, Sr. Family for the bequest of
scholarship funds for such research.
1. Grad, Legislative Responses to the New Biology: Limits and Possibilities, 15
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 480, 502 (1968).
2. Reilly, In Vitro Fertilization-A Legal Perspective, in GENETICS AND THE LAW 359,
360 (A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1976). See also Smith, Manipulating the Genetic Code.-
Jurisprudential Conundrums, 64 GEO. L.J. 697, 708 (1976) (report of Dr. Doullas Bevis of
Leeds Univ. of three successful implants of human embryos that had been fertilized in vitro,
resulting in births of three children).
3. See Biggers, In Vitro Fertilization, Embryo Culture and Embryo Transfer in the
Human, in ETHICS ADVISORY BOARD, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WEL-
FARE, APPENDIX: HEW SUPPORT OF RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN IN VITRO FERTILIZA-
TION AND EMBRYO TRANSFER § 8, at 2 (1979) [hereinafter cited as EAB APPENDIX]. Biggers
cites studies by Jacobsen, Sites, and Arias-Bemal in 1970; Mastroianni and Noriega in 1970;
Brackett, Seitz, and Mastroianni in 1971; and Soupart and Strange in 1974, all conducted in
the United States. He also mentions Edwards and Steptoe in England; Lopata and Associ-
ates in Australia in 1978; Petrov-Maslakov and Associates in Leningrad in 1973; and Cas-
tenen and Associates in Hamburg in 1977. Id.
4. See Public Opinion Survey by the Gallup Poll, August 1978, in 1961 GALLUP OPINION
INDEX 1-5 (Dec. 1978), reprinted in EAB APPENDIX, supra note 3, § 21, at 1-5. In a Gallup
Poll conducted Aug. 4-7, 1978, 93% of the persons surveyed indicated that they had either
read or heard about the birth of Louise Brown and her conception outside of her mother's
body. Id at 1. The first American baby conceived in vitro was Samantha Steel, who was
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Many approved of the in vitro procedure,5 viewing it as a possible op-
tion to couples wanting a child. Others voiced disapproval, citing the un-
natural aspects of the procedure, its immoral implications, and the possible
risks involved. 6 Even among those who generally approved of the proce-
dure, many thought it should not be readily available as a standard medi-
cal practice until further research on the safety of the procedure could be
conducted. 7
Thus, from her crib in Oldham, England, the Brown baby was raising
the consciousness of people all over the world as the propriety of this new
technology became a subject of universal concern. With the discussions
came the debate as to the legal ramifications of in vitro fertilization and a
realization that our legal system was not prepared to deal with this revolu-
tionary means of creating life.8 To create a legal mechanism for dealing
with in vitro fertilization tomorrow, an understanding of the process and
the laws that affect it today is in order. Although various combinations of
in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer are possible, 9 this Article focuses
born in England on Oct. 2, 1981. See U.S. Test-Tube Baby's Birth is Revealed, Dallas Times
Herald, Dec. 15, 1981, § A, at 18, col. 1.
5. Public Opinion Survey, supra note 4, at 4. 60% of those surveyed by Gallup indi-
cated that they favored the in vitro procedure when the following question was posed to
them:
Actually what the doctor did was to remove an egg from one of the woman's
ovaries and fertilize it in the laboratory with sperm from her husband. The
embryo was then implanted in her uterus. The embryo grew inside the wo-
man and was born like other babies. Some people oppose this kind of opera-
tion because they feel it is "not natural". Other people favor it because it
would allow a husband and wife to have a child when otherwise it would be
impossible. Which point of view comes closer to your own?
Only 27% indicated opposition to the operation and 13% had no opinion. Id Perhaps the
phrasing of the question in terms of providing hope for a childless married couple and in
focusing on the question of the naturalness of the procedure may have served to promote a
positive response. See also Harris & Associates, A Study of the Attitudes a/American Women
Toward the "Test- Tube" Procedure and Related Matters." Summary Section, EAB APPENDIX,
supra note 3, § 22, at 1-9. In a survey of 1501 American women conducted by Louis Harris
and Associates for Parents Magazine shortly after the birth of Louise Brown, 52% of those
interviewed indicated that they approved of the procedure, while 24% disapproved, and 24%
were unsure. However, of 1501, 85% felt that "the procedure should be available to married
couples who are otherwise unable to have children." Id at 2. See Yarrow, Test-Tube Ba-
bies.- For Or Against?, PARENTS, Nov. 1978, at 81.
6. Harris & Associates, supra note 5, at 7.
7. Id at 2. 63% of all those surveyed would prohibit the use of the procedure until
further testing to determine its impact upon birth defects. Only 24% desired to see the proce-
dure immediately available.
8. See Note, The "Brave New Baby" and the Law- Fashioning Remediesfor the Victims
of In Vitro Fertilization, 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 319, 323-24 (1978). The author notes that no
direct legal regulation of in vitro fertilization exists. Id at 324.
9. The Ethics Advisory Board lists the following possible combinations of in vitro fer-
tilization and/or embryo transfer:
i. In vitro fertilization without embryo transfer
ii. In vitro fertilization and subsequent embryo transfer
a. Transfer to the uterus of the donor
b. Transfer to the uterus of one or more other females
iii. In vivo fertilization and subsequent embryo transfer
a. Fertilization by means of mating
b. Fertilization by means of artificial insemination
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on the in vitro fertilization and subsequent embryo transfer either to the
ovum donor or to another female.
I. THE PROCESS
In vitro fertilization is the process by which an o~cyte (or egg) is re-
moved from the female, placed in a culture medium, and subsequently
fertilized by sperm.' 0 After several days, when the fertilized egg reaches
the blastocyst stage that coincides with the normal time of implantation, it
is transplanted into the female's body,II resulting in embryo transfer. To
retrieve the ripe oocyte from the female donor, the donor is placed under
general anesthesia and a laparoscopy is performed. The process involves
making a small incision in the patient's abdomen and inserting into the
incision a laparoscope, an instrument allowing the doctor to view the re-
productive organs. Follicular fluid containing the mature follicle or egg is
then aspirated from the ovary by use of a needle. ' 2 The fluid is mixed with
pre-washed semen and diluted to simulate conditions found in the Fallo-
pian tubes. 13 A few hours after the mixture, fertilization may occur, and
about twelve hours later, the embryo is transferred to a solution supportive
of embryo development. Approximately two days later, the fertilized egg
develops into an eight-celled embryo or blastocyst, and is transferred by
means of a fine tube or cannula into the uterus of the carrier female for
implantation in the uterine wall.14
Seven per cent of all couples in the United States are estimated to be
infertile, one third of these because of the wife's sterility. 15 Forty per cent,
560,000, of these women are sterile because of diseased oviducts or Fallo-
pian tubes. '6 Others are sterile because of their inability to produce eggs,17
and still others may be able to conceive, but are unable to carry a child to
term.' 8 Various combinations of in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer
could allow a number of these women to become mothers. For the woman
with blocked or damaged Fallopian tubes, in vitro fertilization provides a
c. Ova of the mated or inseminated female
d. Donor ova introduced into the female prior to fertilization.
ETHICS ADVISORY BOARD, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, REPORT
AND CONCLUSIONS: HEW SUPPORT OF RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN IN VITRO FERTILI-
ZATION AND EMBRYO TRANSFER 3-4 (1979) [hereinafter cited as EAB CONCLUSIONS].
10. See generally Biggers, supra note 3, for a discussion of the biology and technique of
in vitro fertilization.
11. See Note, supra note 8, at 319.
12. See Lopata, Johnston, Hoult & Speirs, Pregnancy Following Intrauterine Implanta-
tion of an Embryo Obtained by In Vitro Fertilization of a Preopulatory Egg, 33 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 117 (1980), for a detailed description of the actual technique used for the in vitro
fertilization and embryo transfer resulting in the birth of Candice Elizabeth Reed in Austra-
lia on June 23, 1980.
13. Comment, Lawmaking and Science.- A Practical Look at In Vitro Fertilization and
Embryo Transfer, 1979 DET. C.L. REV. 429, 432.
14. Id
15. Biggers, supra note 3, at 35.
16. Id




means of by-passing the tubes completely in the process of uniting sperm
and egg.m9 This is the technique that produced Louise Brown, as well as
the other documented cases of in vitro fertilized children. 20
In cases in which a couple desires a child, but the female is not ovu-
lating, the process of embryo transfer could allow for the birth of a child
by means of what may be referred to as the feminine counterpart to artifi-
cial insemination by donor. 2' As with artificial insemination by donor,
embryo transfer results in the birth of a child that is genetically the product
of one member of the infertile couple and a third-party donor. The differ-
ence is that the donor contributes the egg, rather than the sperm, in the
newer technique. The egg may be fertilized artificially by the sperm of the
infertile woman's husband, either by direct insemination of the ovum do-
nor or in vitro. The resulting blastocyst can subsequently be transferred to
the uterus of the infertile wife, allowing her the experience of carrying the
child and giving birth.22
In addition to allowing the infertile woman to give birth, this procedure
has the advantage of being much less demanding on the donor than surro-
gate motherhood. For, at best, the donor would merely have to undergo
the artificial insemination, and a subsequent flushing out of her uterus with
a catheter, neither of which involves surgery, or a great investment of
time.23 Furthermore, a woman who can produce eggs, but is unable to
carry a child to term, could have a child that was genetically hers and her
husband's by having her own egg fertilized by her husband's sperm. The
egg then can be transferred to the uterus of a carrier24 through a similar
flushing and implanting procedure.
II. HISTORY OF THE IN VITRO FERTILIZATION PROCESS
Although in vitro fertilization in humans is a relatively recent phenome-
non, reports of such conceptions in rabbits and guinea pigs are approxi-
mately one hundred years old.25 Likewise, the report of the transfer of an
19. Biggers, supra note 3, at 36.
20. See West, Associated Press Release (International), July 22, 1979, London. See also
Roundtree, Second Pregnancy at Nation's First Test-Tube Baby Clinic, United Press Interna-
tional Release (Domestic), Aug. 3, 1981, Norfolk, Va. (report of 13 successful in vitro births,
11 of which were in Australia).
21. Artificial insemination by donor accounts for the birth of approximately 20,000 chil-
dren per year, and has been recognized by legislation in many states. Fleming, New Fron.
tiers in Conception: Medical Breakthrough and Moral Dilemmas, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1980,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 14.
22. Id at 24. This process, sometimes referred to as prenatal adoption, would allow the
infertile woman to share a special bond with the child, even though she has contributed no
genetic material.
23. Id at 42. Two brothers, Drs. Randolph Seed, M.D. and Richard W. Seed, Ph.D.
report trying to perform this "artificial embryonation" at their Reproduction and Fertility
Clinic in Chicago. Id
24. This process has been compared to that of wet nursing, as the carrier would provide
the nourishment for a child that was not genetically hers.
25. Gould, Fertilization In Vitro of Nonhuman Primate Ova: Present Status and Ration-
alefor Further Development of the Technique, in EAB APPENDIX, supra note 3, § 14, at 1.
Onanoff reported in vitro fertilization in rabbits and guinea pigs in 1893. Id
[Vol. 35
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animal embryo dates to about the same period.26 Since then, in vitro fer-
tilization27 and embryo transfer 28 have been accomplished with many dif-
ferent types of animals. Although relatively little such experimentation
has taken place with nonhuman primates, 29 a great deal of recent research
involving mammalian embryos has been reported.
30
The first mention of the possibility of in vitro fertilization for humans
has been credited to Dr. Landrum Shettles of Columbia3' in the 1950s. A
number of studies of in vitro fertilization began in the 1970s in the United
States, as well as throughout the world.32 These prompted debate as to the
possible implications of the procedure. 33 The question of in vitro fertiliza-
tion became an issue for the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare (HEW), now the Department of Health and Human Resources, when
Dr. Pierre Soupart of Vanderbilt University sent an application to the Na-
tional Institutes of Health (NIH) requesting a $375,000 grant for the pur-
pose of studying in vitro fertilization. Soupart planned to remove, fertilize,
and perform a microbiopsy on about 450 eggs from women undergoing
surgery, with no intention of having these embryos mature for the purpose
of live birth.34 At the time of his request, federal regulations affecting
projects funded by HEW did not apply to products of conception prior to
implantation. 35 Soupart was informed in 1975 that he would be funded by
NIH, contingent on a review by the Ethics Advisory Board of HEW.
36
26. Biggers, supra note 3, at 18. In 1890 Walter Heape reported successfully transfer-
ring two fertilized eggs from an Angora rabbit into the oviduct of a Belgian hare rabbit. The
Belgian rabbit had mated a few hours before. Ultimately six offspring were born, two of
which were Angoras. Id
27. T. CARNEY, INSTANT EVOLUTION: WE'D BETTER GET GOOD AT IT 103 (1980). The
eggs of hamsters, rabbits, mice, guinea pigs, rats, cats, gerbils, pigs, and cows have been
successfully fertilized in vitro. Id; see Foote, In Vitro Fertilization in Perspective, Relative to
the Science andArt of DomesticAnimal Reproduction, in EAB APPENDIX, supra note 3, § 16,
at 1-28.
28. T. CARNEY, supra note 27, at 104. Successful embryo transfers have been reported
in mice, rats, rabbits, pigs, sheep, and horses. Id
29. Gould, supra note 25, at 6-7. In vitro fertilization has been observed in the rhesus
monkey, olive baboon, and squirrel monkey, only the latter of which appears to be a promis-
ing model for further research. Id at 7. But see Sackett, A Nonhuman Primate Research
fodel of Development Risk Following In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer, in EAB
APPENDIX, supra note 3, § 15, at 1. He proposes the pigtail monkey (Macaca nemestrina) as
a potential subject for further research with in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer. Id
30. See Biggers, supra note 3, at 22, table 3.
31. T. CARNEY, supra note 27, at 104; Biggers, supra note 3, at 1.
32. See note 3 supra.
33. See 44 Fed. Reg. 35,033, 35,036 (1979). Biologist James Watson initiated the ethical
debate in 1971 in an article published in Atlantic Monthly. See note 46 infra. That same
month an article defending in vitro fertilization was published. Edwards & Sharpe, Social
Values and Research in Human Embryology, 231 NATURE 87 (1971).
34. Fleming, supra note 21, at 48.
35. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.203(b)-(c) (1980); see Flannery, Weisman, Braverman & Lipsett,
Legal Issues Concerning In Vitro Fertilization, in EAB APPENDIX, supra note 3, § 18, at 3.
These authors suggest that in vitro fertilization research was not sufficiently sophisticated at
the time, so the need for preimplantation regulations was not apparent. Id at F-3 n. 14. See
also Flannery, Weisman, Lipsett & Braverman, Test Tube Babies: Legal Issues Raised by In
Vitro Fertilization, 67 GEO. L.J. 1295 (1979).
36. Fleming, supra note 21, at 48.
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This board, composed of thirteen lawyers, doctors, and ethicists, 37 recom-
mended in May 1979 that Soupart's application be accepted, thus allowing
for the study of human embryos provided the embryos not be sustained
"beyond the stage normally associated with the completion of implanta-
tion," or two weeks after fertilization. 38 The report of the Board was sub-
mitted to Patricia Harris, then Secretary of HEW, where it remained
pending her approval. 39 That approval was never granted by Harris or her
successor, and no further action has been taken on the issue of federal
funding of in vitro fertilization projects.4°
In contrast to Dr. Soupart's research, which was dependent on federal
funding and not designed to produce live births, a privately funded clinic
with the professed goal of helping infertile couples have a baby through
the use of in vitro fertilization sought approval from the State of Virginia
to begin operation under the sponsorship of the Eastern Virginia Medical
School. After five months of hearings and studies by state and local health
agencies in Virginia, the Virginia State Health Commission issued the nec-
essary "certificate of need" on January 8, 1980, authorizing the establish-
ment of the clinic, after concluding the laboratory would violate no state or
federal law.41 The clinic, which was met with considerable opposition,42
announced the birth of the first test-tube baby in the United States on De-
cember 28, 1981.4 3 Drs. Berel Held and Martin Quigley of the University
of Texas Medical School announced in July 1981 that a similar clinic was
in operation in Houston."4
III. ETHICAL AND MORAL CONSIDERATIONS
The analysis of the legal ramifications of in vitro fertilization cannot be
done without considering the serious moral and ethical implications of the
37. The members of the Ethics Advisory Board are Sissela Bok, Ph.D.; Jack T. Conway;
Henry W. Foster, M.D.; James C. Gaither, J.D.; David A. Hamburg, M.D.; Donald A. Hen-
derson, M.D.; Maurice Lazarus; Richard A. McCormick, S.T.D.; Robert F. Murray, M.D.;
Mitchell W. Spellman, M.D.; Daniel C. Tosteson, M.D.; Agnes N. Williams, LL.B.; and
Eugene M. Zweiback, M.D. EAB CONCLUSIONS, supra note 9.
38. Id at 107.
39. Fleming, supra note 21, at 48.
40. Telephone interview with Dennis Doyle, Assistant Regulations Officer, Office for
Protection from Research Risks, National Institutes of Health (Sept. 8, 1981). Dr. Soupart
died on June 10, 1981; the effect of his death on the request for funding is not clear at this
time.
41. See Test-Tube Baby Lab OK-Pleases Prospective Mothers, Associated Press Re-
lease (Domestic), Jan. 9, 1980, Norfolk, Va.
42. The most fervent opposition came from the Tidewater Chapter of the Virginia Soci-
ety for Human Life, which unsuccessfully sought an injunction against the clinic. See To-
day's Topic." Exciting New Hope or B.N. W.?, Associated Press Release (Domestic), Apr. 2,
1980, Norfolk, Va.
43. America's First Test-Tube Baby Normal Healthy, Dallas Times Herald, Dec. 29,
1981, § A, at 2, col. 1.
44. Nichols, United Press International Release (Regional), July 9, 1981, Houston, Tex.
In a telephone interview, Dr. Martin Quigley stated that the Houston clinic removes only
two eggs from the mother. If these were successfully fertilized, both would be implanted.
This procedure is in accord with an agreement between the clinic and the Committee for the
Protection of Human Subjects, Houston, Tex. (Sept. 23, 1981).
[Vol. 35
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propriety and possible regulation of technological methods of creating life.
Although some of these considerations may not be within the scope of gov-
ernmental intervention, any statutes enacted in this area should reflect the
society for which they are drafted. Moral and ethical considerations will
color the determination of whether in vitro fertilization should be en-
couraged, monitored, or perhaps prohibited by legislation.
Biologist James Watson is credited with initiating the debates concern-
ing the propriety of in vitro fertilization.45 In an article appearing in Atlan-
tic Monthly in May 1971 he first expressed concern as to the future
implications of the procedure.46 Philosopher Leon Kass 47 and theologian
Paul Ramsey 48 later expressed their apprehensions. The debates contin-
ued with contributions from a number of sources, including biologist R.G.
Edwards of the famous British team of Edwards and Steptoe. 49 The dis-
cussions continue today as the success of the procedure is a reality.
One of the threshold issues relates to the "naturalness" of in vitro fertili-
zation as a means of human reproduction. One view is that human con-
ception and reproduction should not be the subject of artificial
intervention. Referring to the conception of babies in a laboratory as a
"degradation of parenthood," Leon Kass expressed the view that a techno-
logical means of reproduction negates the humanity of the process. 50 This
view is shared by many theologians including Protestant theologian Paul
Ramsey. 51 Although Pope John Paul II has made no official statement on
in vitro fertilization,52 Vatican spokesman Rev. Pierfrance Pastore has
stated that Roman Catholic doctrine is clear: fertilization "must be carried
out according to nature. '53 Similarly, Rev. William Smith, spokesman for
the Roman Catholic Archdiocese in New York, has referred to in vitro
fertilization as "morally objectionable"5 4 because it involves "switching
the marital bed into a chemistry set." 55 A related view has been espoused
45. See note 33 supra.
46. Watson, Moving Toward the Clonal Man, 227 ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1971, at
50.
47. Kass, Making Babies--The New Biology and the Old Morality, 26 PUB. INTEREST,
Winter 1972, at 32.
48. Ramsey, Shall We 'Reproduce"? I The Medical Ethics of In Vitro Fertilization, 220
J.A.M.A. 1346 (1972).
49. Edwards, Fertilization of Human Eggs In Vitro.- Morals, Ethics and the Law, 49 Q.
REV. BIOLOGY 3 (1974).
50. Kass, supra note 47, at 49, quoted in Walters, Ethical Issues in Human In Vitro Fertil-
ization and Research Involving Early Human Embryos, in EAB APPENDIX, supra note 3, § 1,
at 8.
51. See P. RAMSEY, FABRICATED MAN: THE ETHICS OF GENETIC CONTROL 104-60
(1970); P. RAMSEY, THE ETHICS OF FETAL RESEARCH (1975).
52. Telephone interview with Richard Doeflinger, Legislative Assistant, Committee for
Pro-Life Activities, National Conference of Catholic Bishops (May 19, 1981).
53. West, supra note 20.
54. Id
55. TIME, July 31, 1978, at 69; see Curran,,In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer:
From a Perspective of Moral Theology, in EAB APPENDIX, supra note 3, § 4, at 7. This view
is consistent with the teachings of Pope Pius XII who, in his first address on artificial insemi-
nation condemned all unnatural means of obtaining semen. Id Curran also refers to Pope
Pius XII, A4ocution to the Fourth International Congress of Catholic Doctors, in THE HUMAN
19821
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by Ehtishamul Haque Thanva, a leading Islamic scholar, who terms the
procedure "a defiance of the laws of nature." 56
A moderate view accepts in vitro fertilization as an alternative for mar-
ried persons who are unable to procreate in the natural way. Roman
Catholic theologian Charles E. Curran, observing that "in vitro fertiliza-
tion and embryo transfer are proposed only for that limited number of
situations in which the normal process cannot take place,"' 57 concludes that
the processes may be acceptable under certain conditions. In vitro fertili-
zation and embryo transfer for childless married persons who desire a
child also have been sanctioned by Jewish theologians, including Rabbi
Israeli Klavon of the Rabbinical Council of America 58 and Rabbi Sey-
mour Siegel, professor of ethics at Manhattan's Jewish Theological Semi-
nary.59 Another view, propounded by bioethicist Joseph Fletcher, not only
deems in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer acceptable, but indeed,
preferable modes of procreation, reasoning that these technological
processes are much more controlled and deliberative than traditional
coitus. 60
Assuming the hurdle of naturalness is overcome, a question remains as
to the rights of the product of conception, and when those rights begin.
One position is that the fetus is a human being from the moment of con-
ception6' and is thus due all human rights at that time. A middle view,
propounded by Kass, 62 is that although a blastocyst may not be a person, it
is indeed human in origin and is a potential human being. It is therefore
due the rights given to all subjects of fetal research, 63 although these may
not be as extensive as those due "persons." The next step along the contin-
uum would grant the rights of human status to the blastocyst only after
implantation, 64 and the most restrictive position asserts birth as the time
that rights accrue to the products of conception.65
BODY: PAPAL TEACHINGS 114 (Monks of Solesmes trans. & eds. 1960). Curran, supra, at 3,
29 n.7.
56. West, supra note 20.
57. Curran, supra note 55, at 19.
58. West, supra note 20.
59. TIME, July 31, 1978, at 69. In commenting on the birth of Louise Brown, Rabbi
Siegel stated: "The Browns were trying to obey the commandment to have children. When
nature does not permit conception, it is desirable to try to outwit nature. The Talmud
teaches that God desires man's cooperation." Id
60. Fletcher, New Beginnings in L!fe." Theologian's Response, in THE NEW GENETICS
AND THE FUTURE OF MAN 78, 87 (M. Hamilton ed. 1972).
61. Curran, supra note 55, at 14. This is the view of the papal and hierarchical magiste-
rium of the Roman Catholic Church. Id
62. Kass, Ethical Issues in Human In Vitro Fertilization, Embryo Culture and Research,
and Embryo Transfer, in EAB APPENDIX, supra note 3, § 2, at 6.
63. Id at 8. Thus, federal regulations that protect subjects from the time of implanta-
tion would presumably apply.
64. T. CARNEY, supra note 27, at 20. Carney bases his conclusion on the premise that a
high percentage of naturally fertilized eggs are also naturally aborted during the preim-
plantation penod. Id See also Curran, supra note 55, at 15-16, who places the beginning of
truly human life at "two to three weeks after conception," reasoning that true individuality
begins at that stage.
65. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 49, at 13-14.
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The question of the time that rights begin to accrue is central to the issue
of possible destruction of fertilized eggs. One of the major objections to in
vitro fertilization is that a number of fertilized eggs may be discarded in
the process of selecting the "best" egg for implantation. Indeed, the tech-
nique used by the Indian doctors (resulting in the alleged second live birth
from in vitro fertilization) involved the administering of hormones induc-
ing superovulation, or the production of more than one egg per cycle in the
mother, with the subsequent fertilization of a number of eggs.66 Kass
points out the number of different fates for the numerous fertilized eggs,
including subsequent implantation, death, experimentation, or perpetua-
tion in vitro.67 The most acceptable alternative is subsequent implanta-
tion; however, this raises a difficulty in that only a certain number of
embryos could be carried safely by any one woman at any one time.
Transferring eggs to other carriers presents potential problems of higher
mortality risks, as well as lineage questions. The second alternative, death
to excess embryos, would be unacceptable to those who view life as begin-
ning at conception. Even if one accepts death as a respectful alternative,
analogizing the loss to the natural loss of unimplanted fertilized eggs,68 the
distinction may still be made that superovulation and multiple fertilization
result in the intentional creation of multiple potential lives, with the under-
standing that most will necessarily be destroyed. Experimentation or per-
petuation in vitro with these fertilized eggs could indeed be argued as a
"fate worse than death."'69
The problem of multiple fertilizations may have been solved by the
practicalities of the in vitro fertilization process itself. The use of hor-
mones to induce superovulation was originally calculated to allow for the
possible recovery of a number of eggs, increasing the chances of a success-
ful fertilization and subsequent embryo transfer. 70 However, the hor-
mones given to stimulate ovulations may have affected the environment in
the uterus adversely, thus making subsequent implantation impossible.7'
As a result, many doctors now are using natural cycles, resulting in the
retrieval of one egg at a time. 72
Assuming that only one egg is fertilized at a time, the risk to this embryo
still may be sizable. Many observers are concerned that little is known
66. West, supra note 20.
67. Kass, supra note 62, at 9.
68. Id at 9-10. Kass points out that 50% of all eggs fertilized as the result of unpro-
tected sexual relations fail to implant, do not remain implanted, or are shed before a preg-
nancy is diagnosed. Id
69. Arguably, this would be the case if the experimentation resulted in excruciating
pain to the embryo.
70. Biggers, supra note 3, at 26-27.
71. Id at 28.
72. Taymor, Current Status of in Vitro Fertilization and Reimplantation, in GENETICS
AND THE LAW II 345, 347 (A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1980). Writing after the birth of
Louise Brown, Taymor indicated that during the three years preceding the writing of his
article, doctors had not used gonadotropic therapy to stimulate or time ovulation. They had
instead relied on measuring the mid-cycle surge of luteinizing hormone in the o0cyte donor
to time the laparoscopy in order to retrieve one mature egg in a normal cycle. Id
1982]
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about the danger of in vitro fertilization to the embryo. 73 As few primate
studies involving in vitro fertilization have been conducted, 74 many advo-
cate more animal studies prior to using the technique on humans.75 Risks
to the offspring include abnormalities because of chromosomal aberra-
tions, fertilization by multiple sperm because of the high concentration of
sperm directly surrounding the egg in vitro, and the possibility that manip-
ulation induces mutations. 76 Proponents of the technique argue first, that
embryos conceived naturally, or in vivo, face many of the same possibili-
ties, 7 7 and secondly, that existing studies indicate no greater risk with in
vitro fertilization than with ordinary fertilization.78 Additionally, nature
has an efficient mechanism for eliminating abnormal embryos, by sponta-
neously aborting them, often prior to the mother's even knowing of her
pregnancy. 79 In fact, 99.3-99.5% of chromosomal abnormalities in vivo are
estimated to be eliminated either through spontaneous abortion or fetal
death.80 Thus, some argue that even if in vitro fertilization results in more
abnormal embryos, they will be eliminated naturally. Such reasoning,
however, does not take into account the possibility that the medical treat-
ment used to implant the embryo and to sustain the pregnancy may in fact
counteract nature's mechanisms for eliminating the abnormal embryo.8 '
In addition to potential risks for the child are risks to the o6cyte donor,
such as (1) the development of ovarian cysts resulting from pretreatment
with the hormones inducing superovulation, (2) dangers associated with
the general anesthesia accompanying the laporoscopy, (3) the greater risk
of spontaneous abortion, and (4) the dangers of amniocentesis associated
with the monitoring of the fetus.82 Although the donor would be an adult
and thus capable of consent, some contend that if the donor is infertile and
desirous of a child, her capacity to consent may be diminished.8 3 Thus,
performing in vitro fertilization may indeed exploit the infertile couple, the
very individuals who are requesting the procedure.8 4 Presented with some
hope of becoming parents, they may be incapable of assessing the low
probability of success85 and the likelihood that they will not benefit di-
73. 44 Fed. Reg. 35,033, 35,044 (1979); Kass, Babies by Means of In Vitro Fertilization:
Unethical Experiments on the Unborn?, 285 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1174, 1175 (1971).
74. Reilly, supra note 2, at 363.
75. EAB CONCLUSIONS supra note 9, at 104-06. See also Kass, supra note 62, at 27;
Mastroianni, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer, EAB APPENDIX, supra note 3, § 13,
at 7.
76. See 44 Fed. Reg. 35,033, 35,036 (1979).
77. Schlesselman, How Does One Assess the Risk ofAbnormalitiesfrom Human In Vitro
Fertilization?, in EAB APPENDIX, supra note 3, § 17, at 27-31.
78. See 44 Fed. Reg. 35,043 (1979).
79. Schlesselman, supra note 77, at 28-29.
80. Id at 29.
81. Id at 30.
82. 44 Fed. Reg. 35,033, 35,044 (1979); Waiters, supra note 50, at 18.
83. 44 Fed. Reg. 35,03, 35,045 (1979); Walters, supra note 50, at 19.
84. Kass, supra note 73, at 1178.
85. Katz, Legal Implications and Regulation of lIn Vitro Fertilization, in GENETICS AND
THE LAW II, supra note 72, at 351,368. The success rate is estimated to be I in 400. Id For
a more optimistic assessment of the success rate, see note 155 infra.
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rectly from the procedure, but merely be contributing to research to enable
some future couple to become parents.
Even if in vitro fertilization would result in the birth of a child, the pro-
cedure arguably is not medically justified, in that it is not therapeutic even
to the potential parents. Although it may allow an infertile couple to have
a child, it has not cured the infertility.86 Yet, alternatively, if our society
sanctions therapeutic abortion why not therapeutic conception?8 7 Such is
the explanation offered by Dr. Edwards who analogizes this treatment to
the prescribing of insulin for diabetics or glasses for the visually impaired;
although "the clinical condition itself remains, the treatment modifies its
expression. 88
Another reason to question the use of in vitro fertilization and embryo
transfer is that these procedures usher in Huxley's Brave New World. Al-
though the use of these techniques by a married couple incapable of pro-
creation without these means appears in and of itself a positive
substitute,89 the argument is made that this would be only the beginning of
an ethical ride down a "slippery slope."90 Eventually, the process might be
used for extramarital purposes. The use of third-party donor o6cytes and
embryo carriers would do much damage to the family as an institution,
presenting lineage problems91 and also contributing to the demeaning of
women,9 2 as they would be mere incubators. In addition, is the argument
that paying for ocytes or for the services of a carrier could ultimately
result in a commodities market of "futures" with the child being the pawn
of the process.9 3
Some persons also fear that the process will be used experimentally and
result in genetic engineering by which we ultimately may "design our de-
scendants."'94 Other fears are that such manipulation could result in the
production of children in the laboratory9 5 or even the use of other mam-
mals as temporary hosts for humans.9 6 These extensions of the process
would thus defy the principle of medical ethics that one should "do no
harm. ' 97 Of course, the counterargument is that not all the ramifications
are negative. Some would argue that in vitro fertilization will lead to posi-
86. Kass, supra note 73, at 1177.
87. Leiman, Human In Vitro Fertilization: A Jewish Perspective, in EAB APPENDIX,
supra note 3, § 6, at 12.
88. Edwards, supra note 49, at 11.
89. Limitation of the process to married couples is acceptable to many theologians. See
EAB CONCLUSIONS, supra note 9, at 107; Curran, supra note 55, at 23.
90. Ramsey, Manufacturing Our Offspring: Weighing the Risks, 8 HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Oct. 1978, at 7.
91. Kass, supra note 62, at 15.
92. Ramsey, Testimony on In Vitro Fertilization, in EAB APPENDIX, supra note 3, § 7, at
3.
93. Schroeder, New Life: Person or Property, 131:5 AM. J. PSYCH. 541, 542 (1974).
94. Ramsey, supra note 92, at 21.
95. T. CARNEY, supra note 27, at 108, reports that there is currently work on an artificial
womb for humans.
96. Kass, supra note 62, at 18.
97. Ramsey, supra note 92, at 13.
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tive developments, including the ability to repair genetic defects prior to
implantation.9" If we accept that man is capable of exercising judgment on
these matters, then arguably the opponents of the procedure should bear
the burden of blocking its use. 99 Otherwise, some valuable benefits might
be lost because of the fear of potential consequences that might never
materialize.
IV. EXISTING REGULATION OF ANALOGOUS PROCEDURES
Before analyzing what laws on in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer
should be promulgated, a review of the currently existing laws on the sub-
ject is in order. To date, no federal or state statutes deal directly with the
subject of in vitro fertilization. Some federal administrative regulations,
however, do provide guidelines for federally funded fetal research.
A. Federal Funding of In Vitro Research
On October 9, 1973, the Secretary of the Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare issued a notice that a special study committee had been
appointed by the Department through the National Institutes of Health for
the purpose of formulating rules for the protection of human subjects in
research.) °° On July 12, 1974, the National Research Service Award Act
created the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Biomedical and Behavioral Research.' 0 The Commission also was
formed to study research involving human fetuses and make recommenda-
tions to the Secretary whether the Department should fund such research,
and if so, under what conditions.'0 2 In 1975, after reviewing proposed
drafts of the HEW appointed study committee, 0 3 the related public com-
ments, and the recommendations of the National Commission, the Secre-
tary amended federal regulations concerning the "Protection of Human
Subjects." 4 Those regulations now provide for the establishment of two
Ethical Advisory Boards, one for the Public Health Service and one repre-
senting the remainder of the Department. 0 5 They stipulate further that:
"No application or proposal involving human in vitro fertilization may be
funded by the Department or any component thereof until the application
or proposal has been reviewed by the Ethical Advisory Board and the
Board has rendered advice as to its acceptability from an ethical
98. See Walters, supra note 50, at 23-24, who lists potential consequences of IVF
research.
99. Gorovitz, In Vitro Fertilization: Sense and Nonsense and a Reply to Leon Kass, in
EAB APPENDIX, supra note 3, § 3, at 22-24.
100. 38 Fed. Reg. 27,882 (1973).
101. National Research Service Award Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, §§ 201-215, 88
Stat. 342, 348-54, as amended by Emergency Medical Services Amendments of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-573, § 18(a), 90 Stat. 2709, 2719.
102. 88 Stat. at 350 (§ 202(b)).
103. See 39 Fed. Reg. 30,648 (1974); 38 Fed. Reg. 31,748 (1973).
104. 45 C.F.R. § 46 (1980).




Other than a section stating that no activities governed by the regula-
tions are to be undertaken until "appropriate studies on animals and non-
pregnant individuals" have been conducted, 10 7 no specific guidelines in the
regulations pertain to in vitro fertilization procedures prior to implanta-
tion. The Secretary explained in 1975 that the regulations do not deal with
this matter "[b]ecause biomedical research is not yet near the point of be-
ing able to maintain for a substantial period the non-implanted product of
in vitro fertilization."' 08 The regulations are specific in protecting only the
products of conception post-implantation. 10 9
Dr. Soupart's request for funding in 1977 prompted a one-and-a-half
year study by the Ethics Advisory Board." 0 On May 4, 1979, the Ethics
Advisory Board issued its report to then Secretary Patricia Harris, approv-
ing Department funding of research involving in vitro fertilization and
embryo transfer if certain specific conditions were met. These conditions
included sustaining in vitro for no longer than fourteen days after fertiliza-
tion embryos that were not to be transferred,"' and attempting embryo
transfer only with gametes obtained from lawfully married couples."l 2
Secretary Harris left office without approving the report.' 13
B. State Regulation of Fetal Experimentation and Articial Insemination
In addition to not providing specific guidelines for in vitro fertilization
and embryo transfer, the HEW regulations only apply to federally funded
experiments and do not preempt any state laws.' 14 As previously men-
tioned, no state laws deal 'directly with in vitro fertilization and embryo
transfer. State statutes, however, do pertain to the related subjects of fetal
experimentation and artificial insemination.
Following the Supreme Court decision of Roe v. Wade," 5 which in es-
sence rendered many state laws on feticide unconstitutional, many states
106. Id § 46.204(d).
107. Id § 46.206(a)(1).
108. 40 Fed. Reg. 33,526, 33,527 (1975).
109. See Horan, Fetal Experimentation and Federal Regulation, 22 VILL. L. REV. 325,
327-29 (1976-1977). The regulations define pregnancy as "the period of time from confirma-
tion of implantation. . . until expulsion or extraction of the fetus." 45 C.F.R. § 46.203(b)
(1980). Fetus is defined as "the product of conception from the time of implantation...
until a determination is made, following expulsion or extraction of the fetus, that it is via-
ble." Id § 46.203(c).
110. See notes 34-40 supra and accompanying text.
111. EAB CONCLUSIONS, supra note 9, at 107.
112. Id
113. Secretary Harris did request public comment on the report. 44 Fed. Reg. 35,033
(1979).
114. 45 C.F.R. § 46.201(b) (1980) includes the following statement: "Nothing in this
subpart shall be construed as indicating that compliance with the procedures set forth herein
willin any way render inapplicable pertinent State or local laws bearing upon activities
covered by this subpart."
115. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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passed statutes designed to control research on aborted fetuses."16 A
number of purposes were contemplated by the legislation. Some statutes
particularly prohibit experimentation that is nontherapeutic to the subject
of the research. 1 7 Some of the statutes clearly are meant to prevent a
market in fetuses for experimentation;" 18 however, it is unclear in most
cases whether these statutes are meant to protect ex utero blastocysts.11 9
Even in the statutes that acknowledge the possibility of in vitro fertiliza-
tion, language in other parts of the statutes appears not to cover the prod-
uct of in vitro fertilization until it reaches a stage beyond that of the eight-
cell blastocyst.120
Because questions involving the more established process of artificial in-
semination are somewhat analogous to those of in vitro fertilization and
embryo transfer, an analysis of the governmental reaction to artificial in-
semination may be illuminating. The process itself dates back to the four-
teenth century when Arabs artificially inseminated horses to produce
superior specimens.' 2' The first documented artificial insemination in
humans is credited to English surgeon John Hunter in 1790,122 and the first
in the United States, to Marion Simms in 1866.123 Today, artificial insemi-
nation is widespread, resulting in an estimated 20,000 births per year. 124
Two different types of artificial insemination may result in a child for a
married couple: (1) artificial insemination by husband (or A.I.H.) and
(2) artificial insemination by donor (or A.I.D.). 125 The first is genetically
analogous to the process that produced Louise Brown. In both the Louise
Brown case and in artificial insemination by the husband, the gametes of
116. Flannery, Weisman, Braverman & Lipsett, supra note 35, at 5-6; see Note, supra
note 8, at 326.
117. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25956(a) (West Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
38, § 81-26(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.13 (West
Supp. 1981); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12J(a)I (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1981); MICH.
COMp. LAWS ANN. § 333.2685 (1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.422(1) (West Supp. 1981);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.037 (Vernon Supp. 1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-346 (1979); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-3 (1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-735 (West Supp. 1981-1982);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6605(b) (Purdon 1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310 (1978).
118. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-26(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 436.026 (1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.13 (West Supp. 1981); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 1593 (1980); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12J(a)IV (Michie/Law. Co-op
Supp. 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-5-(B) (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.2-(3) (Supp.
1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.14 (Page 1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-735(a)
(West Supp. 1981-1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-308(b) (Supp. 1981); Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-
115 (1977).
119. See Flannery, Weisman, Braverman & Lipsett, supra note 35, at 6.
120. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-26(7) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 145.421(2)-(3), .422 (West Supp. 1981).
121. Lombard, Art#Fcial Insemination--Civil Law and Ecclesiastical Views, 2 SUFF. U.L.
REV. 137 (1968); Shaman, LegalAspects fArtficial lnsemrination, 18 J. FAM. L. 331 (1980).
122. Shaman, supra note 121, at 331 (noting W. FINEGOLD, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 6
(1964)).
123. Shaman, supra note 121, at 331 (noting S. KLING, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW
59-60 (1965)).
124. See note 21 supra.
125. Artificial insemination of a single woman by a donor also is possible. One case,
C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (Jur. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1977), has recognized
the donor as entitled to visitation rights as a father.
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conception were contributed by a married couple, thus raising few legal
questions of legitimacy or geneology. If, in the in vitro fertilization pro-
cess, the egg donor is also the carrier of the resulting fetus, the comparison
to A.I.H. is thus quite strong. One potential problem area in A.I.H. in-
volves the use of frozen sperm. In cases in which sperm are used well after
the termination of a marriage, legal questions of legitimacy could arise in
in vitro fertilization as they may in A.I.H. because many states have stat-
utes presuming the legitimacy of any child born within 300 days after the
dissolution of a marriage.126
Another potential legal problem area in A.I.H. that could apply equally
to in vitro fertilization relates to the question of whether the process is
deemed a consummation of a marriage for purposes of determining
whether to grant an annulment. A 1949 English case L v. L 127 granted a
wife an annulment from her husband although she had conceived a child
by A.I.H. In vitro fertilization arguably offers even less contact between
spouses and, thus, also would not suffice to consummate a marriage.
Artificial insemination by donor raises more legal problems when the
sperm contributor is not the husband of the mother, but usually an anony-
mous donor. Early cases questioned the legitimacy of children conceived
in this manner. For example, in finding a woman who had been artificially
inseminated without her husband's consent guilty of adultery, a Canadian
court in 1921 emphasized that the "possibility of introducing into the fam-
ily of the husband a false strain of blood" was what rendered the act adul-
terous. 128 An even stricter decision was rendered by an Illinois court in
1954 which held A.I.D. adulterous even when the husband had con-
sented. 129 Recent cases, however, have determined that it is the sexual act
itself that is adulterous, not the placing of the male seed in the female
body. 130
Related to the question of adultery is the question of the legitimacy of
the child. In a custody proceeding, Strnad v. Sirnad,13' in which the hus-
band of the mother was requesting visitation rights with the child born of
artificial insemination consented to by the husband, a New York court in
1948 granted the husband's request.132 The court stated that the child was
126. See, e.g., LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 185 (West Supp. 1981): "A child born less than
three hundred days after the dissolution of the marriage is presumed to have been conceived
duing the marriage." See also Katz, Legal Implications of In Vitro Fertilization and Its
Reguation, in EAB APPENDIX, supra note3, § I9, at 11, for examples of statutes from other
states.
127. [1949] 1 All E.R. 141, 146. The annulment was based on the ground of incapacity.
Id
128. Orford v. Orford, 58 D.L.R. 251 (1921).
129. Doornbos v. Doornbos, 23 U.S.L.W. 2308 (Cook County, Ill., Super Ct. Dec. 13,
1954), appeal dismissed on procedural grounds, 12 Ill. App. 2d 473, 139 N.E.2d 844 (1956).
130. MacLennan v. MacLennan, [1958] Sess. Cas. 105. See also People v. Sorensen, 68
Cal. 2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 501, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7, 13 (1968), which rejects as "patently absurd"
any notion of adultery, either with the doctor, or with the sperm donor who may be
thousands of miles away at the time of the insemination.
131. 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
132. 78 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
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not illegitimate, but rather should be viewed as "semi-adopted."' 33 The
New York court again recognized the husband's parental rights in relation
to an A.I.D. child in People ex rel. Abajian v. Dennett,134 in which a hus-
band brought a habeas corpus proceeding to recognize visitation rights
granted to him under a separation agreement. When the wife sought to
defeat the action, claiming the child had been conceived by A.I.D., the
court deemed the mother estopped. 135 The Sirnad reasoning of "semi-
adoption" was criticized in the later case of Gursky v. Gursky,' 36 which
pronounced another A.I.D. child illegitimate, noting that A.I.D. children
were not adopted pursuant to state law and no state statute legitimized
A.I.D. children. 37 Therefore, the child whose father was not the husband
of the mother was illegitimate, but because of the husband's consent to the
insemination process, he was estopped from denying liability to support
the child. Gursky was flatly rejected in the case of In re Adoption ofAnony-
mous, 38 a proceeding in which the former husband of the wife refused to
grant consent to the adoption of the A.I.D. child of the wife. The argu-
ment of legislative inaction was regarded as "an unsound basis for any
inferences favorable or unfavorable," ''39 as bills are sometimes not re-
ported because the legislature may consider that the courts could reach
proper solutions without the need for specific legislation.' 40 The court in
Anonymous stated that a child born of consensual A.I.D. during a mar-
riage is the legitimate child of that marriage.14' Much of the support for
this decision comes from the leading California case of People v. Soren-
sen, 42 which interpreted "father" in the California support statute to in-
clude "a husband, who unable to accomplish his objective of creating a
child by using his own semen, purchases semen from a donor and uses it to
inseminate his wife to achieve his purpose."' 43
Today a total of twenty states have statutes dealing with A.I.D.44 All of
133. Id
134. 15 Misc. 2d 260, 184 N.Y.S.2d 178 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
135. 184 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
136. 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
137. 242 N.Y.S.2d at 409-11.
138. 74 Misc. 2d 99, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430, 434 (Sur. Ct. 1973).
139. 345 N.Y.S.2d at 435.
140. Id
141. Id at 435-36.
142. 68 Cal. 2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968).
143. 437 P.2d at 500, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
144. ALASKA STAT. § 20.20.010 (1975); CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005 (West Supp. 1981); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 45-69f to -69n (1981); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1981); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 74-101.1, -9904 (1981); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1974 & Supp. 1980); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West
Supp. 1981); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN § 1-206 (1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43,§ 556E (1980); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2824 (1980); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 40-6-
106 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.061 (1979); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1976); OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 551-553 (West Supp. 1981-
1982); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, .243, 677.355, .360, .365, .370, .450, .990 (1979); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 53.446 (Supp. 1981); TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 12.03 (Vernon 1975); VA.
CODE § 64.1-7.1 (1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050 (West Supp. 1981); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 767.47 (West 1981), § 891.40 (West Supp. 1981-1982). Note that all of these statutes
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these provide that the husband of the artificially inseminated woman shall
be deemed the father of a child conceived by the insemination. Some
specify that the written consent of the husband be recorded and kept confi-
dential and that such record be opened only by court order rendered for
good cause.' 45 A number of these statutes also state specifically that the
sperm donor is relieved of all obligations and rights to the child. 146 These
statutes, nonetheless, are peculiarly devoid of any particular regulation as
to the process itself or the liability for a defective child. Although ten
states require artificial insemination to be administered by a licensed phy-
sician,' 47 only Oregon specifies that the sperm donor is to be selected by
the doctor and that one may not be a donor if afflicted with a genetic de-
fect or disease or knows or has reason to know that he has a veneral dis-
ease.' 48 Georgia peripherally deals with the question of liability by
relieving the doctor of all civil liability to the husband, wife, or child, ex-
cept for negligent administration or performance of the actual
insemination. 149
Not only is there little state regulation of the A.I.D. process, and specifi-
cally, the selection of donors, but evidence exists that little actual screening
of donors by the doctors performing the insemination occurs. In a study
conducted in 1978 of 471 doctors listed by the American Fertility Society
as performing A.I.D., most doctors surveyed answered that they generally
pick the sperm donors.' 50 Yet, they admitted to very little screening of
donors other than the fact that donors generally were medical students or
hospital residents, university or graduate students, or combinations
thereof,15' thus resulting in donors of above-average intelligence and
health. Although 96% of the doctors stated that they inquired into the his-
tory of donors, the inquiry usually consisted of merely asking the donor if
he had any genetic diseases or presenting him with a short check-list of
familial diseases. Thus, most physicians relied on the donor to reveal any
possible defects. Illustrative of this fact is the finding that 94.7% of the
require written consent by the husband, except for the Maryland statute, where consent is
presumed.
145. CAL. CIv. CODE § 7005 (West Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-69h (1981);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-130 (Supp. 1980); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1979); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 126.061 (1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 553 (West Supp. 1981-1982); OR.
REV. STAT. § 677.365 (1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050 (West Supp. 1981); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1981-1982).
146. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005 (West Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-69j (1981);
MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1979); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.239 (1979); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 12.03 (Vernon 1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050 (West Supp. 1981);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1981-1982).
147. ALASKA STAT. § 20.20.010 (1975); CAL. CIv. CODE § 7005 (West Supp. 1981);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-69g (1981); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 74-101.1, -9904 (1981); MONT. REV.
CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.061 (1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,§§ 551, 553 (West Supp. 1981-1982); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.360 (1979); VA. CODE § 64.1-7.1
(1980); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1981-1982).
148. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 677.360, .370 (1979).
149. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-101.1(c) (1981).
150. Curie-Cohen, Luttrell & Shapiro, Current Practice ofArtifcial Insemination by Do-
nor in the United States, 300 NEw ENO. J. MED. 585, 586 (1979).
151. Id
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surveyed doctors indicated they would reject a carrier of Tay-Sachs dis-
ease, but less than 1% of the doctors indicated they tested donors for car-
rier status. 1 52 In fact, only 28.8% of the doctors questioned performed any
biochemical tests other than blood groupings, and this procedure was
mainly to detect communicable diseases.' 53
Even while artificial insemination, a relatively common occurrence, has
yet to be handled adequately by legislation, the questions of in vitro fertili-
zation and embryo transfer move into sight. Because the latter are some-
what analogous to insemination, similar regulation of each may be in
order. Just as the legal problems of geneology become more complicated
when a third party male agrees to become a sperm donor to an infertile
couple, so too do complications arise when a third party female is intro-
duced to the in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer processes.
In many ways, ovum donation by a third party with the sperm donor's
wife carrying the child is the female counterpart of artificial insemination
by donor. This could be accomplished in one of two ways. Either the
donor's ovum could be removed and mixed with the husband's sperm in
vitro and then transferred to the wife to carry, or the egg donor could be
artificially inseminated with the husband's sperm, and then if a pregnancy
resulted, the blastocyst could be transplanted to the sperm donor's wife's
uterus for implantation. Each process involves advantages and disadvan-
tages. In the first, the scientific chances of success would be far less, be-
cause it would require the surgical removal of the ovum from the donor,
the precariously delicate procedure of fertilization outside of her body, and
the subsequent attempt to implant a resulting blastocyst in the wife. If the
fertilization were not successful, another surgical procedure would be nec-
essary the following month to try to retrieve another egg from the same
donor. Then, even if that were achieved and fertilization occurred, the
delicate transfer still would be necessary. A possible advantage to this pro-
cedure is that the ovum donor would never actually carry a fertilized egg.
Her contribution would merely be that of a gamete, analogous to a sperm
donor's contribution in A.I.D. Thus, presumably once the gamete is re-
moved from her body, her rights to the child would be no greater than that
of a sperm donor. A woman's right to privacy in matters relating to her
own body, which was recognized in Roe v. Wade, 154 would not apply to
the fertilized egg since it never really existed within her. It appears that
statutes such as the A.I.D. statutes relieving the donor of both liability and
rights to the resulting fetus would be proper.
The second procedure involving insemination of the ovum donor would
alleviate some of the technological risks in achieving the actual pregnancy.
This is because the chances of a fertile woman conceiving after being in-
seminated by a fertile man's sperm are much greater than the chances of a
152. Id at 588.
153. Id
154. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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successful in vitro fertilization. 55 Additionally, if the insemination did
not impregnate, the process could be repeated the following month. If a
pregnancy resulted, the fertilized egg could be merely flushed from the
uterus, rather than having to be surgically removed as in the case of the
unfertilized egg being prepared for in vitro fertilization.
Although the second process may be easier physically, it presents a
problem in that the ovum donor, if the process is successful, actually
would be carrying a fertilized ovum in her body. Her right to control her
own body might be viewed as superior to any contractual rights claimed by
the infertile couple. Thus, if the donor wished to abort the child, or to
carry it to term and keep it, she may be entitled to do so legally, raising
many of the same issues raised today by surrogate motherhood where the
surrogate contributes both her gamete and her womb.
Whichever method is selected for fertilizing and transplanting the egg,
questions similar to A.I.D. arise. Because the donation of the ovum raises
the "possibility of introducing into the family" of the wife "a false strain of
blood,"' 156 allegations of adultery and illegitimacy may arise. 157 No
greater example of consent, however, may be imagined than the wife's as-
senting to the transplant of the conceptus and actually carrying the fetus to
delivery. Thus, just as statutes recognize as "father" a man who consents
to the artificial insemination by donor of his wife, statutes also should rec-
ognize as "mother" the wife who consents to receiving the fertilized ovum
into her own body.
The selection of a proper donor is obviously as important in ovum dona-
tion as in sperm donation, and regulation of the screening process is
equally necessary in both. In some ways, ovum donations present fewer
problems. Because the availability of donated ovums would presumably
be much less than for sperm donations, 158 the chances of incestuous mar-
riages of children conceived in this way would be less. 159 The smaller
number of donors available for ovum donation, however, could result in a
commercial market for eggs for a much higher price than sperm dona-
tions.' 60 Additionally, the fact that ovum donors would be scarcer than
sperm donors would mean that the ovum donor pool would be far less
select than the sperm donor pool, which tends to consist of men more intel-
ligent and healthy than the general population. In addition to considering
155. Drs. Berel Held and Martin Quigley of the University of Texas Medical School
report that the chances of pregnancy by in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer are about
5% according to data from successful procedures in England and Australia. 10 Women Given
Test Tube Chance, The Times-Picayune-The States Item, July 10, 1981, § 1, at 8, col. 1.
156. Orford v. Orford, 58 D.L.R. 251, 258 (1921).
157. See notes 128-43 supra and accompanying text.
158. This presumably would be the case, as a woman generally produces only one ma-
ture egg per month, whereas the male produces millions of sperm in a single ejaculation.
Additionally the retrieval of the egg is a much more complicated process.
159. See the Glass and Hajnal study of artificial insemination referred to in Curie-Co-
hen, Luttrell & Shapiro, supra note 150, at 588-89. This study concludes that even in A.I.D.
"inadvertent inbreeding" is an inconsequential problem as compared to inbreeding in the
general population. Id
160. Reilly, supra note 2, at 369.
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if the donor carried any genetic disease, the selector will have to consider
maternal age.' 6 ' Thus, questions of breach of warranty against ovum
banks that release defective eggs' 62 and malpractice suits against physi-
cians for improper screening of donors 63 could arise.
The issue of anonymity of ovum donors also should be addressed be-
cause a revelation of the donations could deter potential donors. As with
A.I.D., the child's right to know the identity of his genetic parents may be
balanced against the desire of the donors for confidentiality. Just as chil-
dren are seeking access to sealed adoption records to learn the identity of
their natural parents, 64 children resulting from embryo transfer may seek
the right to know the identity of their genetic mothers. By statute, all legal
rights and liabilities between donor and child, such as mutual rights of
inheritance, may be severed, but psychological and medical reasons for
revelation still might arise. 165
A third party might also be involved in the embryo transfer process by
being the carrier for a conceptus composed of the gametes of the husband
and wife desiring a child. Traditionally, a mother is both the gamete do-
nor and the carrier of a child.' 66 The severance of the elements of the
maternal role would raise questions of establishing maternity that are far
more mind-boggling than previous paternity issues. Because there would
be no direct physical contact between the husband and the carrier and no
"false strain" in the wife's blood line, questions of adultery should not
arise vis-A-vis the husband and wife seeking a child. Nonetheless, a car-
rier's husband might argue that his wife, by carrying another man's child,
was guilty of adultery, especially if the carrier's husband had not
consented.
161. Schlesselman, supra note 77, at 8-9. The author notes that chromosomal abnormali-
ties appear to increase with maternal age. Id
162. See Smith, Artificial Insemination Redivivus: Permutations Within a Penumbra, 2
J.L. MED. 113, 122 (1981), in which Smith suggests a possible recovery in strict liability for
the selling of defective sperm. See Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Bank v. Hansen, 195 Colo.
529, 579 P.2d 1158, 1159 (1978) (supplying of blood by a hospital blood bank was sale of
product, and patient who contracted hepatitis following blood transfusion could maintain
cause of action against the bank in strict liability and for breach of implied warranties).
163. See Smith, supra note 162, at 123, who notes that a claim against a doctor for im-
proper screening of a sperm donor has recently been raised in a Nevada case to be decided
by the state supreme court, Fitzgerald v. Rueckl, No. 11433 (Washoe County, Nev., 2d Judi-
cial Ct., filed Oct. 20, 23, 1978), appeal docketed, Dec. 22, 1978. The lower court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
164. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Rand, 347 So. 2d 450, 452 (Fla. App. 1977) (access
denied for failure to show good cause); In re Gilbert, 563 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Mo. 1978) (re-
manded to determine whether good cause existed); In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 768 (Mo.
1978) (remanded to determine whether good cause existed); In re Linda F.M., 95 Misc. 2d
581, 409 N.Y.S.2d 638, 647 (Sur. Ct. 1978) (access denied), af 'd, 52 N.Y.2d 236, 437
N.Y.S.2d 283 (1981); In re Anonymous, 92 Misc. 2d 224, 399 N.Y.S.2d 857, 859 (Sur. Ct.
1977) (good cause found); In re Sage, 586 P.2d 1201, 1207 (Wash. App. 1978) (access
denied).
165. See In re Adoption of Female Infant, 5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2311, 2313-14 (D.C.
Super. Ct. 1979); In re Adoption of Spinks, 32 N.C. App. 422, 232 S.E.2d 479 (1977).
166. Revillard, Legal Aspects of Artficial Insemination and Embryo Transfer in French
Law, 23 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 383, 392-96 (1974).
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In some ways, a third-party carrier of a couple's conceptus is compara-
ble to the current practice of surrogate motherhood, 67 although the anal-
ogy to wet-nursing is perhaps more appropriate because the carrier has no
genetic link to the child. 168 The real issue involved here is "Who is the
mother?" The A.I.D. cases offer no guidelines because the male never car-
ries the child. In this embryo transfer situation, the husband and wife are
the genetic parents. Yet, without the carrier, the child would not be born.
Could the child have two mothers? If so, how are the rights of each to the
child established?
If the carrier is established as the child's mother, or has some maternal
rights, her ability to agree prior to the child's birth to allow the childless
couple to keep the child is questionable. In essence, the carrier would be
relinquishing her parental rights to the child and agreeing to an adoption.
A number of legal problems arise from such an arrangement. First, some
states have laws prohibiting private adoptions except in cases where a par-
ent places the child with a stepparent or close relative.' 69 Secondly, to
have a binding agreement between the couple and the surrogate, some
consideration is necessary. 170 If part of that fee is for agreeing to the adop-
tion, legal problems will result. In some states, paying a parent to induce
that person to allow an adoption is a crime.' 7' The Michigan statute
prohibiting such payment recently was challenged on constitutional
167. In Louisville, Kentucky, Surrogate Parenting Association, Inc. has been established
to bring together couples desiring a child with surrogates. The surrogate agrees to be artifi-
cially inseminated with the husband's sperm, hoping to become pregnant and carry a child
that the surrogate later would relinquish to the couple.
168. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
169. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 45-63, -63a (1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 904 (1975); GA.
CODE ANN. § 74-403 (1981); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 2A (Michie/Law. Co-op 1981);
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 710.51 (Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.22 (West. Supp.
1981).
170. In surrogate mother cases in which the surrogate provides both the ovum and the
womb, combined legal, medical, and surrogate fees range between $13,000 and $20,000.
Ward, Pregnancyfor Pay, The Times-Picayune--The States Item, Feb. 5, 1981, § 6 (Lifes-
tyle), at 1. One surrogate mother was paid $10,000 for her services. L.A. Daily J., Apr. 18,
1980, at 2, col. 3.
171. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273 (West 1980) states:
(a) It is a misdemeanor for any person or agency to offer to pay money or
anything of value, or to pay money or anything of value, to a parent for
the placement for adoption, for the consent to an adoption, or for cooper-
ation in the completion of an adoption of his child. This section does not
make it unlawful to pay the maternity-connected medical or hospital and
necessary living expenses of the mother preceding and during confine-
ment as an act of charity, as long as the payment is not contingent upon
placement of the child for adoption, consent to the adoption, or coopera-
tion in the; completion of the adoption.
(b) It is a misdemeanor for any parent to obtain the financial benefits set
forth in subdivision (a) with the intent to receive such financial benefits
without completing the adoption or without consenting to the adoption.
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 710.54 (Supp. 1981-1982) reads in part:
(1) Except for charges and fees approved by the court, a person shall not
offer, give, or receive any money or other consideration or thing of value in
connection with any of the following:
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grounds of privacy in the case of Doe v. Kelley, 172 which involved an ar-
rangement to pay a surrogate $5000 plus medical expenses in return for
her surrendering and agreeing to the adoption of a child she conceived by
artificial insemination. The court, in upholding the statute, recognized
that the constitutional right to privacy was not absolute and should be
weighed against the compelling state interest in preventing "baby
bartering."' 73
Even in states without laws specifically rendering such payment crimi-
nal, courts have deemed payments to induce an adoption to be against
public policy. 174 These cases, however, may be distinguished from those in
which the payment covers more than the motivation to consent to the
adoption and is in the best interests of the child.' 75 Thus the payment to a
surrogate arguably is not just for her consent to the adoption, but also for
the mother's services of being impregnated, carrying a child, and ulti-
mately going through the delivery. 176 In the instance of embryo transfer,
where the gametes are contributed by the adopting couple, the best inter-
ests of the child may involve being with both his genetic parents rather
than with his womb mother.
Another obstruction to surrogate mother contracts is that the agreement
to surrender the child is reached prior to the child's birth, indeed even
prior to conception. Courts have not been particularly receptive to prena-
tal releases to adopt. 177 Recently, Kentucky's attorney general rendered
an advisory opinion declaring surrogate mother contracts illegal and unen-
(a) The placing of a child for adoption.(b) The registration, recording, or communication of the existence of a





172. 6 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3011 (Wayne Co., Mich., Cir. Ct. 1980).
173. Id at 3013.
174. See Willey v. Lawton, 8 I11. App. 2d 344, 132 N.E.2d 34, 35 (1956), in which the
court denied recovery on a note given to a natural father as consideration for his consent to
an adoption by the mother and her second husband, and Downs v. Wortman, 228 Ga. 315,
185 S.E.2d 387, 388 (1971), in which the Georgia Supreme Court held a mother's consent to
adoption void when the mother was offered her plane fare to her parents' home provided
that she consented.
175. In re Estate of Shirk, 186 Kan. 311, 350 P.2d 1 (1960). In this case the Kansas
Supreme Court upheld an oral contract that provided that a mother would consent to having
her daughter adopted by the child's grandmother in exchange for having the grandmother
leave part of her estate to both the mother and child. 350 P.2d at 13.
The court in Reimche v. First Nat'l Bank, 512 F.2d 187, 189 (9th Cir. 1975), upheld an
agreement whereby the mother of an illegitimate child consented to having the father adopt
the child in exchange for his providing for the mother in his will. The court found that the
"adoption was in the best interest of the child and the pecuniary gain was not the motivating
factor on the mother's part." Id at 189.
176. Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 1980 S. ILL. U.L.J. 147, 157.
177. See Krueger v. Bunker, 104 Ariz. 26, 448 P.2d 82, 86 (1969) (stating that prenatal
consent was voidable); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2549, 2550 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1981) (voiding mother's written consent to adoption of her child prior to child's
birth); e. Johnson v. Cupp, 274 N.E.2d 411, 414 (Ind. Ct. App. 1971) (upholding father's
consent to adoption of his child rendered before the child's birth).
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forceable.178 In declaring that "the strongest legal prohibition against sur-
rogate parenting in Kentucky is founded in the strong public policy against
the buying and selling of children,"' 179 the attorney general cited Kentucky
statutes that prohibited a mother from consenting to an adoption before
the fifth day after the child's birth 180 and that prohibited a parent from
petitioning for voluntary termination of parental rights until the fifth day
after the child's birth.' 8'
The surrogate contract, even if upheld on the issue of consideration,
raises many other legal problems. Presumably, the surrogate is agreeing to
impregnation, pregnancy, delivery of the child, and then relinquishment of
all parental rights; however, her standard of care during the pregnancy
also should be articulated clearly. The adoptive couple has an interest in
the surrogate's drinking, smoking, and drug consumption during the preg-
nancy. If the surrogate did not take proper care of herself, threatening the
health of the fetus, what rights would the adoptive couple have? Could
they obtain an injunction or restraining order to control the surrogate's
behavior? How would it be enforced?
In a surrogate contract, the adoptive parents would be agreeing to pay at
least the expenses relating to the pregnancy and to take the child when
born. Usually, the agreement is that the adoptive parents could be bound
to take a child even if defective. If the defect was caused by the surrogate's
breaching the terms of the contract by not taking proper care of herself,
would the adoptive parents be free to refuse to take the resulting child?
Could the resulting child, as a third party beneficiary to the surrogate con-
tract, sue the womb mother for injuries?' 82 Or perhaps, if the defect were
detected in the early months of pregnancy, would either party have the
right to terminate the pregnancy? 83
Even if the child had no physical or mental problems, one of the parties
to the contract might change his or her mind. Prior to impregnation the
problems would be minor; however, a breach after impregnation would be
much more complicated. If the surrogate decided to abort during her first
trimester of pregnancy, she might be liable in damages for the parents'
pecuniary loss under the contract.' 8 4 She might be sued in tort for the
infliction of mental distress,' 85 but she could not be forced to carry the
child to term. Under the holding in Roe v. Wade, she would have the right
178. Surrogate Motherhood Contracts Declared Illegal by Kentucky .4. G., 7 FAM. L. REP.
(BNA) 2246, 2247 (1981) (advisory opinion by attorney general of Kentucky).
179. Id
180. Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.500 (Supp. 1980).
181. Id § 199.601.
182. Tuchler, Man-Made Man and the Law, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J, 310, 317 (1978).
183. Under the holding of Roe v. Wade, the carrier should have the right to make such a
decision unless the contract is deemed as a waiver of the constitutionally protected right to
privacy.
184. Keane, supra note 176, at 167.
185. See id at 167 nn. 139 & 140, pointing out that emotional losses generally are not
recoverable in contract (see RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 341 (1932)), but that relief in
tort for infliction of mental distress might be available (see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 46 (1965)).
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to control her own body. Under contract law, the adoptive couple would
not be able to demand specific performance of her personal services.' 86
If the surrogate who has contributed ovum and womb decided to breach
her agreement and keep the child after delivery, the struggle would be one
between natural parents.18 7 In the embryo transfer situation, however, in
which the surrogate is merely a carrier, her right to the child presumably
would be much weaker because she as womb mother would be opposing
both genetic parents. Conversely, if the adoptive couple breached the con-
tract by refusing to accept the child after delivery, they should be obligated
to support the child they sought to create. The tragic result of all these
scenarios is that an innocent child may become the victim. For, even if
support is guaranteed, the child may be deprived of a loving family
environment.
V. TORT CLAIMS
In vitro fertilization and embryo transfer also raise interesting issues of
tort law. A resulting child might sustain an action for injuries suffered or
for his wrongful life. Similarly, claims could arise on behalf of parents for
the wrongful destruction of life, the wrongful creation of life, or the birth
of a deformed child.
The first suit dealing specifically with in vitro fertilization was brought
in a New York federal court by Dr. and Mrs. John Del Zio, who claimed
$1.5 million in damages from Manhatten's Columbia Presbyterian Medi-
cal Center and Dr. Raymond Vande Wiele 188 for the wrongful termination
of an in vitro fertilization procedure. Mrs. Del Zio, who was infertile be-
cause of diseased oviducts, agreed in 1972 to allow Dr. Landrum Shettles
to proceed with the in vitro fertilization procedure using her husband's
sperm. After fertilization but prior to implantation, the specimen was de-
stroyed by Dr. Wiele, the Chief of Obstetrics and Gynecology. Wiele
claimed that Dr. Shettles lacked the skills to perform the procedure prop-
erly, and that the hospital's committee on experimentation had not ap-
proved.' 89 Referring to the procedure as "slipshod," doctors at the
hospital claimed that if the egg had been implanted sucessfully, Mrs. Del
Zio would have contracted peritonitis and might have died.' 90 Mrs. Del
Zio claimed that the destruction of the fertilized egg without her consent
denied her the chance of having a child, causing her physical damage and
186. 5A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1204 (1964).
187. Such a struggle is brewing in a Los Angeles superior court where a couple is suing
for custody of a child conceived by artificial insemination of a surrogate. The mother's
attorney moved for dismissal on the grounds that California law does not treat semen do-
nors as natural fathers. Although no allegation of breach of contract was advanced, the
court said it could not ignore the issue. News Notes, 7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2351, 2351-52
(1981).
188. Del Zio v. Manhattan's Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center, No. 74-3588
(S.D.N.Y., filed Apr. 12, 1978).
189. The First Test-Tube Baby, TIME, July 31, 1978, at 58, 61.
190. Test Tube Bereavement, NEWSWEEK, July 31, 1978, at 70.
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emotional distress. A jury of four women and two men' 91 awarded Mrs.
Del Zio damages of $50,000 for emotional distress, with nominal damages
being assessed to her husband.1
92
The relief afforded Mrs. Del Zio was not specifically for the wrongful
death of the fetus, but rather was a recognition of a severe loss, somewhat
analogous to a property loss.' 93 Although New York has a wrongful death
statute, as do all the other states and the District of Columbia, 194 New
York is among the states that only recognize the action for a live born
child. 195 Thus, it is not surprising that a state that does not allow recovery
191. Id
192. See 44 Fed. Reg. 35,033, 35,050 (1979).
193. Katz, supra note 126, § 19, at 27.
194. ALA. CODE § 6-5-410 (1977); ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.15.010, .55.580 (1973 & Supp.
1981); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-611 to -612 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-906 to -907
(1979 & Supp. 1981); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377 (West Supp. 1981); COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 13-21-201, -203 (1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-555 (1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 3704 (1975); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 16-2701 (Supp. 1978-1979); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 768.16 -.27 (West Supp. 1981); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 105-1301, -1307 to -1310 (1968 &
Supp. 1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-3 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 5-310 (1979); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 70, § 2.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-1-2 (Burns 1973);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.336 (West Supp. 1981-1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-1901 to -1905
(1976); KY. CONST. § 241; Ky. REV. STAT. § 411.130 (Supp. 1980); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art.
2315 (West 1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-804 (1981); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. §§ 3-901 to -904 (1980); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 229, § 2 (Michie/Law. Co-op
Supp. 1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922 (Supp. 1981-1982); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 573.02 (West Supp. 1981); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-13 (Supp. 1981); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 537.080 -.085 (Vernon Supp. 1981); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-512 to -513 (1979); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 30-809 to -810 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 41.085, .100 (1979); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 556.12-.14 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:31-1 to -6 (West 1952 & Supp.
1981-1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-2-1 to -3 (1978); N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 16; N.Y. EST.,
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §§ 5-4.1 to .6 (McKinney 1981), §§ 11.3.2 to .4 (McKinney 1967 &
Supp. 1980-1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-53 (Pam. Supp. 1981), § 28A-18-2 (1976); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 32-21-01 to -06 (1976 & Supp. 1979); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2125.01 -.03
(Page 1976 & Supp. 1981); OKLA. CONST. art. XXIII, § 7; OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1053-
1054 (West 1961 & Supp. 1981-1982); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.101- .100 (1979); PA. CONST.
art. 3, § 18; 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5524, 8301-8302 (Purdon Pam. 1981); PA. R. Civ. P.
2201-2207, 2224-2225; R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-7-1 to -13 (1970 & Supp. 1981); S.C. CODE
§§ 15-51-10 to -60 (1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 21-5-1 to -4 (Supp. 1981); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 20-5-106 to -108, -111 to -116 (1981); TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 26; TEX. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 4671-4678 (Vernon 1952 & Supp. 1980-1981); UTAH CONST. art. XVI,
§ 5; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-11-6 to -7 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 1491-1492 (1974 &
Supp. 1981-1982); VA. CODE §§ 8.01-50 to -56 (1977 & Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 4.20.005- .020, .046-.060 (1962 & Supp. 1981); W. VA. CODE §§ 55-7-5 to -8 (1981);
WiS. STAT. ANN. §§ 895.03 -.031, .04 (West 1966 & Supp. 1981-1982); Wyo. STAT. §§ 1-4-
101 to -102 (1977), §§ 2-14-201 to -202 (1980).
195. Some states do not recognize a cause of action for the wrongful death of a stillborn
fetus. See Kilmer v. Hicks, 22 Ariz. App. 552, 529 P.2d 706 (1974); Justus v. Atchison, 19
Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977); Stern v. Miller, 348 So. 2d 303 (Fla.
1977); McKillip v. Zimmerman, 191 N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 1971); State ex re. Hardin v. Sand-
ers, 538 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1976); Egbert v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573, 260 N.W.2d 480 (1977);
Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951); Graft v. Taggert, 43 N.J.
303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301
N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969); Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966); Marko v. Phila-
delphia Transp. Co., 420 Pa. 124, 216 A.2d 502 (1966); Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d
9 (1964); Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969).
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for the wrongful death of a viable fetus likewise would not recognize the
action for a preimplanted conceptus. A wrongful death action for such a
conceptus probably would not survive in any state, because in most of the
cases that have recognized a cause of action for the wrongful death of a
fetus, the fetus was viable, 9 6 or at least "quick."197
Other possible actions on behalf of parents for destruction of a concep-
tus would include one for intentional destruction with uninformed paren-
tal consent 9" and one for negligent destruction by the doctor or
hospital.199 The first action would not lie, however, if the parents had in
fact been properly advised of the attendant risks.2°° Thus, an inquiry
would be necessary to determine if the parents had voluntarily consented
to the termination after being meaningfully informed of the risks to the
mother and the fetus should the procedure continue. 201 The action for
negligent destruction would face the difficulties of establishing the degree
of care demanded of the physician in a relatively untried procedure, as
well as the problems associated with proving causation by negligence, as
opposed to termination by natural causes in this precariously delicate
procedure. 202
196. See, e.g., Simmons v. Howard Univ., 323 F. Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1971); Panago-
poulous v. Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220 (S.D.W. Va. 1969); Mace v. Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706 (D.
Alaska 1962); Eich v. Town Gulf Shores, 300 So. 2d 354 (Ala. 1974); Hatala v. Markiewicz,
26 Conn. Supp. 358, 224 A.2d 406 (1966); Gorke v. Le Clerk, 23 Conn. Supp. 256, 181 A.2d
448 (1962); Worgan v. Greggo & Ferarra, Inc., 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557 (1956); Chrisafoge-
orgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973); Britt v. Sears, 150 Ind. App. 487,
277 N.E.2d 20 (1971); Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962); Mitchell v. Couch,
285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955); Rice v. Rizk, 453 S.W.2d 732 (Ky. App. 1970); Orange v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 443 S.W.2d 650 (Ky. App. 1969); Valence v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 50 So. 2d 847 (La. App. 1951); Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. App. 1923);
Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 331 N.E.2d 916 (Mass. 1975); State ex rel Odham v. Sher-
man, 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964); O'Neill v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 188 N.W.2d 785
(1971); Pehrson v. Kistner, 301 Minn. 299, 222 N.W.2d 334 (1974); Verkennes v. Corniea,
229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949); Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954);
White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 458 P.2d 617 (1969); Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135
A.2d 249 (1957); Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924 (Okla. 1976); Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio
App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959); Libbee v. Permanente Clinic, 268 Or. 258, 518 P.2d 636(174); Presley v. Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 365 A.2d 748 (1976); Fowler v. Woodward,
244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964); Moen v. Hanson, 85 Wash. 2d 597, 537 P.2d 266 (1975);
Baldwin v. Butcher, 155 W. Va. 431, 184 S.E.2d 428 (1971); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967); cf. Danos v. St. Pierre, 402 So. 2d 633
(La. 1981) (recognizing the parents' cause of action for the wrongful death of their child who
was born dead due to a prenatal injury sustained as a six-month fetus). The court in Danos
did not discuss the necessity for quickness or viability. Tennessee courts previously have
denied a cause of action for death of a viable fetus. See, e.g., Hamby v. McDaniel, 559
S.W.2d 774 (Tenn. 1977); Durrett v. Owens, 212 Tenn. 614, 371 S.W.2d 433 (1963); Hogan v.
McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1958). The Tennessee wrongful death act was
amended in 1976 to include the death of a viable fetus within the coverage of that act. See
TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-5-106(b) (1981).
197. Georgia recognized a cause of action for the wrongful death of a quick fetus in
Shirley v. Bacon, 154 Ga. App. 203, 267 S.E.2d 809 (1980); Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App.
712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955).
198. Katz, supra note 126, at 26.
199. Id at 27.
200. Id at 26.
201. Id
202. Id at 27.
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The estate of the conceptus also could have a cause of action against the
doctor for wrongful destruction. The problem with such a suit is that the
child never would be born alive, thus never becoming a person 20 3 having
standing. An additional difficulty would arise if the conceptus's estate at-
tempted to sue the parents who had consented to a termination. Even if
the definition of person in the fourteenth amendment could be distin-
guished from the definition of person for standing, thus allowing for the
unborn to bring such an action, the mother's right to privacy, as recognized
in Roe v. Wade, theoretically would deny relief to the estate of the concep-
tus. Until a preimplanted conceptus can mature outside of the woman's
body,2°4 the woman's right to prevent implantation presumably would pre-
vail over any rights of the conceptus.
.4. Child's Action When Born Alive
A child produced by in vitro fertilization who actually is born alive but
suffers from some abnormality or defect may have a cause of action
against the doctor or hospital for negligence involved with the in vitro fer-
tilization. The duty could be owed directly to the child, as in the negligent
performance of the actual fertilization or implantation, or derivatively, as
a breach of duty in not informing the parents of potential problems that
arise independent of the physician's control.20 5 The two basic causes of
action that an abnormal child might bring are an action for damages
caused by prenatal injury and a wrongful life action, claiming it would
prefer not having been born at all to suffering a life of deformity.
1. Prenatal Injury. The recognition of a cause of action by a child for
prenatal injuries is a relatively new development, generally traced to the
1946 case of Bonbrest v. Katz.2°6 In that case a child prevailed in an action
against the physician for injuries negligently sustained at delivery. 20 7 The
Bonbrest case is credited with turning the tide away from the previously
controlling rule enunciated in the 1884 case of Dietrich v. Inhabitants of
Northampton,208 denying a child the right to maintain an action for inju-
ries received prior to its birth. 2°9 Today every jurisdiction allows for re-
covery by the child for prenatal injuries.210 Although some jurisdictions
still adhere to the theory that the child must have been viable at the time of
the injury to sustain a cause of action,21' the modern trend is to allow
203. Although recovery has been permitted for children suffering prenatal injuries, the
distinction is that these children were born alive and thus had acquired personhood. See
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
204. See T. CARNEY, supra note 27, at 108 (research on artificial womb for human beings
is in progress).
205. Comment, "Wrongful Li'e" The Right Not to Be Born, 54 TUL. L. REV. 480, 490
(1980).
206. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
207. Id at 139.
208. 138 Mass. 14 (1884); see Sylvia v. Gobeille, 101 R.I. 76, 220 A.2d 222, 223 (1966),
which recognizes Bonbrest as the case that started the departure from the Dietrich rule.
209. 138 Mass. at 17.
210. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 55 (4th ed. 1971).
211. Viability at the time of injury was stressed in Bonbrest as a necessary prerequisite to
sustaining a cause of action for injuries. 65 F. Supp. at 140.
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recovery to the child for injuries sustained before viability.212
Claims of in vitro children may involve injuries suffered prior to viabil-
ity, as the injuries might occur prior to implantation and indeed sometimes
before conception. The courts, by recently recognizing the right of a child
to bring a cause of action for injuries sustained because of negligence oc-
curring prior to conception, have made recovery by an in vitro child much
more probable. In Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, Inc. 213 the
Tenth Circuit, interpreting Oklahoma law, allowed a cause of action on
behalf of Mongoloid twins against a pharmaceutical company that had
manufactured birth control pills. 21 4 The pills, which the mother had taken
prior to the children's conception, allegedly altered the mother's chromo-
somal structure. The court specifically noted the recognition of such a
cause of action need not await approval by the Oklahoma legislature. 215
Similarly, in Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital216 the Supreme Court of Illi-
nois held that a child had a cause of action against the hospital and the
doctor for injuries sustained as a result of a negligently performed transfu-
sion on the mother prior to the plaintiff's conception. 21 7 A year later, cit-
ing both Renslow and Jorgensen, the Eighth Circuit in Bergstreser v.
Mitchell218 allowed an infant to recover from the doctors and hospital for
brain damage resulting from physicians' negligent performance of a caesa-
rean section on the mother prior to the conception of the plaintiff.21 9 Al-
though Missouri had no specific legislation on preconception torts, the
Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court in looking "for guidance" to
Missouri law, which recognized a cause of action for prenatal injuries.220
Thus, courts have recognized a duty of care owed by the doctor to the
child, which runs through the mother even prior to the child's concep-
tion.22' For the in vitro child claiming injury sustained in the process of
212. See Sylvia v. Gobeille, 101 R.I. 76, 220 A.2d 222, 223 (1966), which stated that
"there is no sound reason for drawing a line at the precise moment of the fetal development
when the child attains the capability of an independent existence, and we reject viability as a
decisive criterion."
213. 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973).
214. Id at 238.
215. Id at 240.
216. 67 II. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977). In this case when the mother was thirteen
years old, defendants had negligently transfused her with Rh-positive blood that was incom-
patible with her Rh-negative blood. 367 N.E.2d at 1251.
217. 367 N.E.2d at 1255-56.
218. 577 F.2d 22, 25 (8th Cir. 1978).
219. Id at 26.
220. Id at 25.
221. Jorgensen states that Oklahoma would treat the problem as one of causation and
proximate cause. 483 F.2d at 240. This reasoning is repudiated in Renslow, the Illinois
Supreme Court favoring the duty theory:
The extension of duty in such a case is further supported by sound policy
considerations. Medical science has developed various techniques which can
mitigate or, in some cases, totally alleviate a child's prenatal harm. In light of
these substantial medical advances it seems to us that sound social policy re-
quires the extension of duty in this case.
367 N.E.2d at 1255; see Comment, Preconception Torts.- A Look at Our Newest Class of
Litigants, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 97, 104-06 (1978), which analyzes preconception torts in
terms of Leon Green's duty theory. For a further explanation of the duty theory, see L.
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fertilization or implantation, the link between the tortfeasor and the plain-
tiff is even less derivative than in the preconception tort cases cited. This is
because the in vitro child's injury would be related directly to the gametes,
the raw material of the plaintiff himself.
2. Wrongful Life. Another possible action available to the in vitro child
is for wrongful life. A wrongful life action is one brought by a child, not
for defects resulting from the defendant's negligence, but for the actual
birth itself.22 2 The claim is made that absent the defendant's negligence,
the child would not have been born.223 In essence, the claim is made that
nonexistence is superior to a handicapped life.224 This situation could
arise in the in vitro fertilization context where some complication arose
and the doctor either failed to test to discover the potential problem or,
knowing of the problem, failed to inform the parents so that they could
make an informed decision whether to continue the process to birth. Al-
though the wrongful life action has received a cool reception by the
courts,2 25 the trend may be changing as evidenced by two recent cases.226
The early precursors of wrongful life actions, perhaps more appropri-
ately deemed "dissatisfied life" cases, 227 involved children claiming a
wrongful life of illegitimacy, rather than deformity. In Zepeda v.
Zepeda228 the plaintiff sued his father for causing him to be born as an
adulterine bastard. The claim was that the father, who was married to
someone other than the plaintiff's mother, seduced the mother by promis-
ing to marry her. Damages were sought for the deprivation of the right to
be a legitimate child, to have a normal home, to have a legal father, to
inherit from the father and the paternal ancestors, and for the stigma of
being a bastard.229 In recognizing that the case appeared to be a "natural
result" of pre-viability injury cases, the court observed that "it makes no
difference how much time elapses between a wrongful act and a resulting
injury if there is a causal relation between them. '230 The court, however,
rejected the action, noting that recognition of the plaintiff's claim would
create a new tort of wrongful life, encouraging "all others born into the
GREEN, THE LITIGATION PROCESS IN TORT LAW: No PLACE TO STOP IN THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF TORT LAW 216 (2d ed. 1977). See also Anonymous v. Physician, 6 FAM. L. REP.
(BNA) 2565, 2566 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 2, 1980). But see Albala v. City of New York, 7
FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2182, 2183 (N.Y. App. Div. Jan. 8, 1981).
222. See Comment, supra note 205, at 485.
223. Id
224. Id at 494-95.
225. See, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421,404 A.2d 8 (1979); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49
N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413
N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), modiFed, 46
N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
226. Scales v. United States, No. A-79-CA-70 (W.D. Tex., filed June 9, 1981, amended
June 12, 1981), appeal docketed, No. 81-1367 (5th Cir. Aug. 12, 1981). Curlender v. Bio-
Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Ct. App. 1980).
227. Comment, supra note 205, at 486.
228. 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964).
229. 190 N.E.2d at 851.
230. Id at 853.
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world under conditions they might regard as adverse" to bring suit, and
stating that the lawmaking function of the judicial process "should not be
indulged in where the result could be as sweeping as here. ''23 1
A similar case, Williams v. State,232 arose in New York a few years later.
In Williams an infant born out of wedlock to a mentally deficient mother
sued the state mental institution in which the mother was confined for neg-
ligently failing to protect the mother from a sexual assault that resulted in
the plaintiff's conception. The claim of the child was similar to that ad-
vanced in Zepeda: deprivation "of property rights, . . .of a normal child-
hood and home life. . . of proper parental care, support and rearing," and
causing the child "to bear the stigma of illegitimacy. '233 In rejecting the
cause of action, the court echoed Zepeda's reasoning, rationalizing that
"[bleing born under one set of circumstances rather than another or to one
pair of parents rather than another is not a suable wrong that is cognizable
in court. '234
The possible action by an in vitro child would be more analogous to the
recent wrongful life actions brought by a deformed child against a physi-
cian for improperly testing for problems, perhaps even prior to conception,
or for not informing the parents if a difficulty were discovered.235 If the
parents were properly informed prior to conception, arguably they could
decide to avoid conception. If the problem was discovered after concep-
tion, the process could be terminated. In either case, a defective child
would not be born. The argument of the child is that nonexistence would
have been the more desirable alternative.
To prove liability, the plaintiff in such cases would have to establish the
traditional elements of negligence: duty, breach of duty, damages and
causation.236 Defining the duty owed by the physician to the child in-
volves a reasoning somewhat analogous to the duty found owed to the
child through the mother in prenatal or preconception tort cases. Presum-
ably, the physician owes a duty to the parents (his patients) to test for
abnormalities and inform them of potential problems. The standard of
care should be that of a reputable physician in the specialized field of in
vitro fertilization. Although the unborn or unconceived cannot act on the
information given by the doctor, a duty exists to the child derivatively, as
the child would suffer most directly the consequences of a breach.237
The child also must establish the link of causation between his or her
231. Id at 858, 859. In fact, in citing the possibility of creating life in a test tube, the
court noted: "If such awesome experiments are successfully pursued and their ultimate goal,
the abiogenesis of human life achieved, would a being so created have a cause of action for
wrongful life against those whose knowledge and skill were so employed?" Id at 859.
232. 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966).
233. 223 N.E.2d at 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 886.
234. Id at 344, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
235. See notes 240-54 supra and accompanying text.
236. Trotzig, The Defeclive Child and the Actions for Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth,
14 FAM. L.Q. 15 (1980).
237. See Comment, supra note 205, at 491, in which the author used this reasoning to
establish a duty in wrongful life cases.
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birth and the physician's action or inaction. In essence, the child must
prove that had the parents been properly informed of the potential dam-
ages to the child, they would have consented to preventing the child's
birth. In analyzing this question, a determination must be made as to the
standard to be applied. Should the causation be analyzed in terms of an
objective standard (what a reasonable person would consent to), or to a
subjective standard (what these particular parents would have chosen)?238
Finally, perhaps the most difficult problem is establishing damages. Al-
though precedent exists for the proposition that life is not always better
than nonexistence, 239 measuring the difference between a life of deformity
and no life at all is difficult. Such a problem faced the Supreme Court of
New Jersey when it denied recovery in Gleitman v. Cosgrove.24° The in-
fant in Gleitman claimed that the defendant doctors negligently failed to
inform his mother during her pregnancy of the effects that her contraction
of German measles might have on the unborn child. The child, born with
sight, hearing, and speech defects, claimed that his mother might have de-
cided to abort him had she been properly informed by the doctors. In
rejecting the claim, the court noted: "The infant plaintiff would have us
measure the difference between his life with defects against the utter void
of nonexistence, but it is impossible to make such a determination. This
Court cannot weigh the value of life with impairments against the nonexis-
tence of life itself."' 24' A similar case, Stewart v. Long Island College Hos-
pital,242 arose in New York. Citing Gleitman, the court refused recovery to
an infant born with birth defects who claimed that the defendant hospital
advised the child's mother during her pregnancy that a therapeutic abor-
tion was not necessary, even though the mother had had German measles
in her first trimester of pregnancy. 243
Recovery was also denied by the Court of Appeals of New York in the
consolidated cases of Becker v. Schwartz and Park v. Chessin.244 The
brain-damaged Becker child claimed that the physician treating his mother
during her pregnancy failed to advise her of the higher incidence of
Down's Syndrome children born to women over thirty-five, or of the avail-
ability of an amniocentesis to determine whether the child would be born
with Down's Syndrome. The Park child's claim was that his parents had
not been properly informed that the polycystic kidney disease from which
he suffered was an inherited condition and of the high risk that the plain-
tiff, who had a sibling with the disease, would also be afflicted. Thus, the
Becker child was claiming he should have been aborted, and the Park
238. Id at 491-92.
239. See Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417,
427 (1977), in which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that a person does have
the "general right. . . to refuse medical treatment in appropriate circumstances."
240. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
241. 227 A.2d at 692.
242. 35 A.D.2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970), aft'd, 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332
N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972).
243. 35 A.D.2d at 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 503-04.
244. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
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child was claiming he never should have been conceived. The court re-
jected both pleas on two grounds: first, that the infants suffered no "legally
cognizable injury," reasoning that no one has a "fundamental right" to be
born perfect, 245 and secondly, that the court could not and, indeed, would
not attempt to create a "hypothetical formula for the measurement" of the
infants' damages.246 The New Jersey Supreme Court in Berman v. Al-
lan247 again rejected an infant's wrongful life claim. The Gleitman reason-
ing that it was difficult to measure damages, was not adopted; rather, the
court believed that the Mongoloid child whose mother had not been in-
formed of the risk or of the possibility of amniocentesis had suffered no
damage cognizable by law, because "[olne of the most deeply held beliefs
of our society is that life-whether experienced with or without a major
physical handicap--is more precious than non-life. '248
The first case to recognize a cause of action for wrongful life, Curlender
v. Bio-Science Laboratories,249 arose in California. The injured child
claimed damages against a medical testing laboratory for negligently con-
ducting genetic tests which, if performed correctly, would have disclosed
the probability that the child would be born with Tay-Sachs disease. The
court found a clear duty owed to the parents. 250 Rejecting the notion that
the wrongful life action involved a right not to be born, the court indicated
the child's damages were for the pain and suffering to be endured during
the child's life span and any special pecuniary loss resulting from the con-
dition.25' Costs of care would also be appropriate if the parents did not
have a suit pending for such relief. If such a suit was pending, the court
favored consolidation.2 52
On June 9, 1981, a federal district court in Texas awarded in Scales v.
United States,2 53 a judgment of $624,000 to a three-year old child born
with damage to almost every major organ. The defendants were physi-
cians who failed to test the plaintiff's mother for pregnancy when she had
German measles. Four hundred thousand dollars was awarded for the
care and treatment of the child to the age of eighteen, $24,000 for the
child's pain, suffering and mental anguish after the age of eighteen, and
$200,000 for his lack of potential employability.254
245. Id at 411, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
246. Id at 14, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
247. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
248. 404 A.2d at 12.
249. 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980).
250. Id at 828, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
251. Id at 831, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489-90.
252. Id, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
253. No. A-79-CA-70 (W.D. Tex., filed June 9, 1981, amended June 12, 1981), appeal
docketed, No. 81-1367 (5th Cir. Aug. 12, 1981).
254. Id No evidence exists that the benefits of life were balanced against the cost of a
life of deformity, even though a balancing test might be more appropriate. A normal life
would be assigned a positive value, nonexistence would rate a neutral value, and life with
defects would be negatively valued. To calculate appropriate damages, the severity of the
handicap would have to be taken into account. In some instances the benefits of life might
outweigh the negative qualities of the handicap, thus resulting in no recovery. See Com-
ment, supra note 205, at 497-98.
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B. Parents'Actions
Analogous to the child's claim of wrongful life is the parents' claim of
wrongful birth. The wrongful birth action involves a claim by the parents
that they would have either avoided conception or terminated pregnancy if
they had been properly advised of the risks of having a deformed child. 255
Similar to the wrongful life claim of the child, the parents in a wrongful
birth action are not claiming that the defendant hospital or physician
caused the deformity, but only that the defendant was negligent in not
properly informing the parents of the risk.25 6 Damages include those for
the pain and suffering and emotional distress of the parents in having a
defective child, as well as for the medical expenses and costs of raising the
child.
2 5 7
Some of the cases such as Gleitman25 8 and Stewart,259 rejecting a wrong-
ful life cause of action for the child, denied that the parents had stated a
cause of action for wrongful birth, based on the strong public policy of
preserving human life and the lack of cognizable damages. The public
policy argument, however, was severely weakened with the rendering of
the Roe v. Wade decision, which sanctioned abortion during the early part
of pregnancy.260 Even prior cases dealing with negligent sterilization re-
sulting in the birth of healthy, but unwanted, children offered precedent
for actions allowing the trier of fact to attempt to measure the expenses
incurred for raising an unwanted child.261 Thus, the later wrongful life-
wrongful birth cases, including the Becker and Park cases262 and
Berman,263 not surprisingly recognized the parents' cause of action, al-
though denying the child's. Interestingly, in the Becker and Park cases,
the court sustained the causes of action for pecuniary damages suffered by
the parents caused by the birth, but denied relief for the emotional harm
suffered by the parents, citing the latter as a "question best left for legisla-
255. See Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
256. See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
257. Trotzig, supra note 236, at 17-18.
258. See notes 240-41 supra and accompanying text.
259. See notes 242-43 supra and accompanying text.
260. See Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 850 (Tex. 1975), in which the majority
sustained a mother's cause of action for expenses for the care and treatment of a deformed
child. The mother claimed that the doctor failed to diagnose rubella during her first trimes-
ter of pregnancy and so did not advise her of the risks involved. Although Roe v. Wade had
been decided in 1973, the facts ofJacobs occurred in 1968 when abortion was illegal under
Texas law. Id at 847-48.
261. See, e.g., Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.W. Va. 1967); Custodio v. Bauer,
251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971). For a
more recent case that applied the benefit rule of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920
(1965), to assess damages, see Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 428 A.2d 1366, 1368 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1981); cf. Speck v. Finegold, 268 Pa. Super. 343, 408 A.2d 496 (1979) (allowing recovery
to parents following unsuccessful sterilization and subsequent unsuccessful abortion, result-
ing in the birth of a child with a crippling hereditary disease).
262. See notes 244-46 supra and accompanying text.
263. See notes 247-48 supra and accompanying text.
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tive address. '264 In contrast, Berman recognized the right of the parents to
recover for mental and emotional damage, but denied recovery for the ex-
penses of rearing the defective child because such recovery would be
"wholly disproportionate to the culpability involved. '265
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS ABOUT REGULATION
The unanswered legal questions relating to in vitro fertilization and em-
bryo transfer may lead to the oft-stated conclusion, "There ought to be a
law. . . ." Laws on who may participate in the techniques, the standards
to be applied, and the rights of the parties involved all may raise constitu-
tional issues as to the right of the government to regulate a very private
aspect of human life. Most of the questions would come in the context of
state statutes because the issue relates to an area of public health, safety,
and welfare. The federal government, however, also might regulate by
conditioning the granting of federal funds for clinical projects on the con-
formance to certain standards of operation. 266
To determine whether a state may regulate the procedures of in vitro
fertilization and embryo transfer, one must determine whether a funda-
mental right is being affected. Making this determination requires an ex-
amination to see if the right is one explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by
the Constitution. If it is, then courts must examine with "strict scrutiny"
any attempts to impinge on that right. Only if a "compelling state pur-
pose" exists for interfering with that right may a statute doing so be up-
held, 267 and even then the regulation must be the least restrictive means of
achieving the state purpose.268
The right to avail oneself of the benefits of in vitro fertilization and em-
bryo transfer certainly may be said to be implicitly guaranteed by the Con-
stitution in its protection of privacy in intimate family matters. The
United States Supreme Court in Meyer v. Nebraska269 included "the right
..to marry, establish a home and bring up children" among the rights of
"liberty" guaranteed in the fourteenth amendment. 270 The constitutional
right to rear one's children was recognized in Pierce v. Society of Sister 271
and in Prince v. Commonwealth ofMassachusetts.272 Similarly, in Loving v.
264. 46 N.Y.2d at 416, 386 N.E.2d at 814, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 902.
265. 404 A.2d at 14.
266. See Smith, supra note 2, at 715.
267. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
268. Note, The Less Restrictive Alternative in Constitutional Adjudication: An Analysis, A
Justjfcation, and Some Criteria, 27 VAND. L. REV. 971, 1029-36 (1974).
269. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
270. Id. at 399.
271. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). The Court stated that "[t]he child is not the mere creature of
the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations." Id at 535.
272. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). The Court referred to the "parent's claim to authority in her
own household and in the rearing of her children" as "sacred private interests." Id at 165.
Note, however, that the court balanced this right against the state's interest "to protect the
welfare of children." id
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Virginia273 the freedom to marry was deemed fundamental, with the Court
protecting interracial marriage from state prohibition. The Court in
Zablocki v. Redhai 274 likewise invalidated a state statute restricting par-
ents with support obligations to minor children from marrying without
court approval.
Another family matter, the right to procreate, was recognized as "funda-
mental to the very existence and survival of the race" in Skinner v.
Oklahoma.275 The Court subjected to strict scrutiny an attempt by the
Oklahoma Legislature to impinge on that right by sterilization of habitual
criminals.276 Later cases dealing with regulation of contraception arose in
the 1960s and 1970s. The first of these, Griswold v. Connecticut,277 pro-
tected the right of married persons to use contraceptives. The Court held a
Connecticut statute restricting that right unconstitutional, reasoning that
the right of marital privacy was protected from governmental intrusion
under the penumbra of guarantees in the Bill of Rights. 278 A similar pro-
tection was afforded to single persons as a matter of equal protection in
Eisenstadt v. Baird,279 a case in which the Supreme Court held a Massa-
chusetts statute banning the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried
persons unconstitutional. 280 According to the Court, "[i]f the right of pri-
vacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so funda-
mentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child. ' 281 Later, in Carey v. Population Services International,282 the
Supreme Court rendered unconstitutional a New York statute that regu-
lated the distribution and advertisement of contraceptives, labeling the
"decision whether or not to beget or bear a child. . . at the very heart of
[the] cluster of constitutionally protected choices. ' 283 In 1975, in the case
of Roe v. Wade, 284 the right to privacy was deemed "broad enough to en-
compass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her preg-
nancy. '' 28 5 In restricting a mother's absolute right to abortion to the first
trimester of pregnancy, the Court recognized the state's interest in protect-
ing the mother's health during the second trimester and the interest of the
potential human life in the third.286
After reviewing these cases on the protection of privacy in family areas,
one may make a convincing argument that state regulation of in vitro fer-
273. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
274. 434 U.S. 374, 390-91 (1978).
275. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
276. Id
277. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
278. Id at 484-86.
279. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
280. Id at 454-55.
281. Id at 453 (emphasis in original).
282. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
283. Id at 685.
284. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
285. Id at 153.
286. Id at 162-65.
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tilization and embryo transfer would intrude upon a fundamental right. If
the decision to beget a child is a protected area of privacy, presumably the
actual method of begetting also would be protected. Thus, any statute af-
fecting this delicate area would have to serve a compelling state interest
and must do so by the least restrictive means.
A number of compelling state interests to regulate in vitro fertilization
and embryo transfer may be raised. For example, the state has a real in-
terest in the health of its citizens. Because studies on in vitro fertilization
and embryo transfer have not been extensively conducted on animals,287 a
state may want to prohibit the use of these techniques until more informa-
tion is available on the attendant risks to both mother and child. The
problem with such reasoning is that the health risks are not definite; hence,
the uncertainty would weaken the position that a compelling state interest
in protecting the health of its citizens is involved.
An analogy may be drawn to sterilization cases; however, even cases
upholding a state's right to sterilize the mentally retarded and deprive
them forever of the right to procreate have required observance of consti-
tutional due process. 288 Additionally, although recent sterilization cases
do not seem to require a showing that potential offspring of the patient
would be similarly inflicted with deficiencies to approve a sterilization, 28 9
many emphasize that the state is interested in the inability of the parent to
care properly for the resulting child.290 Thus, absolutely prohibiting
couples from attempting in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer as a
means of procreating, without either proof of physical harm to mother or
child, or an inability to care later for that child, appears premature and
overbroad.
Another concern of the state may be that these new techniques raise a
number of legal problems that cannot be solved. Thus, the state may claim
a compelling interest in prohibiting their use. Prohibition, however, does
not seem to be the least restrictive means for dealing with the legal issues
involved in in vitro fertilization. Many of the questions involving legiti-
macy and liability already have been raised by artificial insemination, and
thoughtful legislation could help determine the resolution in both areas.
Embryo transfer with surrogate carriers, however, raises some seemingly
insurmountable questions of public policy that go beyond those of in vitro
fertilization and perhaps could justify more restrictive legislation. A state,
287. See generally Reilly, supra note 2.
288. Even the extreme case of Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), found "scrupulous com-
pliance" with the Virginia statute at issue and "months of observation" of the subject to
assure that the state's interest existed. Id at 207. See also In re Cavitt, 182 Neb. 712, 157
N.W.2d 171, 177 (1968), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 996 (1970); In re Sterilization of Moore,
289 N.C. 95, 221 S.E.2d 307, 311 (1976).
289. See, e.g., In re Cavitt, 182 Neb. 712, 157 N.W.2d 171 (1968), appeal dismissed, 396
U.S. 996 (1970).
290. See North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp.
451 (M.D.N.C. 1976); In re Sterilization of Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 221 S.E.2d 307 (1976); In re




in the interest of promoting the traditional family, may wish to prohibit
single persons from availing themselves of the procedures. In light of the
Eisenstadt decision, such an outright prohibition would be highly suspect
on equal protection grounds.
Although a governing unit may be limited in its direct prohibition or
regulation of in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer, it can exert signifi-
cant influence by refusing to fund such projects or conditioning its funding
on the meeting of certain standards. Presumably, any federal control over
these procedures would assume this avenue of approach. Precedent for
such influence is afforded by recent cases recognizing a state's right to en-
courage childbirth rather than abortion by upholding statutes that pro-
vided state funding for hospital services associated with childbirth, but not
for nontherapeutic abortions. The issue first arose in the context of review-
ing state medical plans. Title XIX of the Social Security Act 291 established
the Medical Assistance (Medicaid) Program to provide federal funding to
states that chose to reimburse needy patients for medical expenses. Partici-
pating states were required to establish "reasonable standards" for ad-
ministering the plan, all of which were to be "consistent with the objectives
of Title XIX. '"292 The Supreme Court recognized the right of participating
states to exclude nontherapeutic abortions from the funding,293 and distin-
guished "direct state interference with a protected activity," as in Roe v.
Wade, from "state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant
with legislative policy."294
A similar right of cities to refuse funding for hospital services for non-
therapeutic abortions, but to provide it for childbirth, was recognized in
Poelker v. Doe.295 A related question arose after the passage of the Hyde
Amendment, which severely limited the use of federal funds for abortions.
In Harris v. McRae296 the Supreme Court held that New York, as a par-
ticipant in the Medicaid Program, was under no obligation to fund abor-
tions for which federal reimbursement was unavailable under the Hyde
Amendment. 297 Additionally, the Court held that the amendment neither
291. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396k (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
292. Id § 1396a(a)(17).
293. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977). This case involved the State of Pennsylvania.
294. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475 (1977).
295. 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
296. 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980).
297. Id at 326; see Departments of Labor, and Health, Education, and Welfare Appro-
priation Act, 1977, Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434, which applied to fiscal
year 1977 and provided: "None of the funds contained in this Act shall be used to perform
abortions except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried
to term." Act of Oct. 13, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-130, § 106, 91 Stat. 1153, 1154, and Act of
Nov. 9, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-165, § 106, 91 Stat. 1323, 1324, extended those provisions
through January and February of 1978. Act of Dec. 9, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-205, § 101, 91
Stat. 1460, 1460, and Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropria-
tions Act, 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-480, § 210, 92 Stat. 1567, 1586, were applicable for the rest of
1978 and 1979. Act of Nov. 20, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 923, 926, applicable
for fiscal year 1980, provided:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this joint resolution except section
102, none of the funds provided by this joint resolution shall be used to per-
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deprived indigent women of their "liberty" guaranteed in the due process
clause of the fifth amendment,298 nor contravened the establishment clause
of the first amendment, merely because it corresponded to tenets of the
Roman Catholic Church.299
Thus, these cases would support governmental refusal to fund in vitro
research or clinical application unless certain standards were met. This
would perhaps allow the funding unit to restrict the recipients of a result-
ing child to married persons or only to infertile couples who had little
other hope for producing offspring.
VII. CONCLUSION
The legal questions raised by in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer
are extensive. Not only is the fate of a child involved in every decision, but
collectively the resulting births could affect the institution of the family,
and ultimately, all of society. Because of the delicate moral and ethical
issues raised, the temptation to refrain from any legislation whatsoever is
strong. Yet, the absence of any consensus as to the propriety of the proce-
dures indicates the need for some general guidelines. Otherwise, the pro-
cedures will be controlled only by the individual consciences of
participants with no guaranteed protection for the resulting child and for
society.
As the questions involve public health and safety, the regulation basi-
cally would lie in the domain of individual states. Uniformity might be
advanced through the adoption of a model act, as suggested by the Ethics
Advisory Board.3°° Because the issues span so many disciplines, drafters
should be recruited from a variety of sectors, including legal, religious,
medical, and social.
One fundamental area needing uniformity is the status and rights of
children born as a result of in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer. Stat-
utes could provide that legitimacy be presumed by considering the wife of
the sperm donor to be the mother of the child, regardless of whether she
carries the child or supplies the ovum. Analogies may be drawn to the
more sophisticated statutes regulating artificial insemination. The donor
or surrogate who is not within the nuclear family that would rear the child
may be relieved by statute of all legal rights and obligations to the child.
Thus the custody, support, and physical responsibility for the child could
be established clearly. To balance the confidentiality of participants with
form abortions except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the
fetus were carried to term; or except for such medical procedures necessary for
the victims of rape or incest when such rape or incest has been reported
promptly to a law enforcement agency or public health service;
Nor are payments prohibited for drugs or devices to prevent implantation of
the fertilized ovum, or for medical procedures necessary for the termination of
an ectopic pregnancy.
298. 448 U.S. at 317-18.
299. Id See also Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980).
300. EAB CONCLUSIONS, supra note 9, at 113.
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the potential medical needs of the child, recordkeeping standards could be
delineated with provisions for access for specified causes.
Much of the regulation of the actual process of in vitro fertilization and
embryo transfer might be better left to the medical profession; however,
some minimal standards of procedure are in order. Statutes could specify
the degree of expertise and skill required of any physician undertaking the
procedure. Additionally, uniform standards for donor selection could be
promulgated. Requirements of testing donors for diseases, restricting the
number of donors to prevent incest, and prohibiting donations from do-
nors over a certain age would contribute to promoting the health of the
resulting child.
Although contracts involving carriers might defy precise legislation for
each case, some policy decisions as to enforceability might be enunciated
by the states. If a dispute were to arise, would the state enforce the con-
tract? If the contract were silent on an ambiguous issue, would guidelines
for resolution be available? States also might consider modes of dealing
with court claims that could arise. Decisions as to which causes of action
could be entertained and the method of determining the type and amount
of relief should be made.
Finally, in cases where federal funds are requested for the in vitro fertili-
zation and embryo transplant research, the government could be much
more active in its regulation. The procedure itself could be more closely
monitored to minimize the destruction of fertilized eggs. Participants
could be limited to infertile married couples only. The government could
condition its aid to a state on the adoption of uniform laws defining the
status of any resulting children.
Just as the in vitro procedure itself is a sensitive matter of the creation of
life, so too should its regulation be viewed. As the physician is acutely
aware of the delicate chemical balance necessary for conception in a petri
dish, so too should society be cognizant of the need for a thoughtful bal-
ance of values in the regulation of the process.
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